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INTRODUCTION
Landowners and governmental bodies, such as local zoning boards,'
often make deals in which the government eases land use restrictions in
exchange for a concession by the landowner, termed an "exaction."2 Land
use exactions are, of course, the subject of substantive judicial oversights and
have received extensive scholarly attention.4 Under current law, a landowner
may bargain away property concessions for permission to engage in
otherwise forbidden land uses only when the government can show that the
concession in question is closely connected and roughly proportional to
development-specific negative externalities. Two U.S. Supreme Court
opinions set forth the relevant bargaining limits: Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission5 requires an "essential nexus" between the property concession
and the legitimate governmental purpose which originallyjustified banning
the land use in question; and Dolan v. City of Tigard adds a requirement of
"rough proportionality" between the harms generated by the land use and
the required property concession.
8
1. While much regulation of land use is local, land is also regulated for various purposes
at the state, regional, and federal levels. See generally FRED BOSSELAN & DAVID CAIa.ES, THE
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972) (analyzing state and regional responses to
land use issues); Robert H. Nelson, Federal Zoning. The Nw Era in Environr.ental Polity. n LA.D
RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTYRIGHTS REBELLION 295 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (discussing the
increasing federal role in land use regulation).
2. WILAm A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 341 (1995) [hereinafter FIScnEL,
REGULATORYTAKINGS] (noting that "[d]evelopers in most communities pay various types of fees
or provide goods in kind to get permission to do their projects," which are "collectively known
as 'exactions'"); see Vicki Been, 'Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Fxadions: R hMinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Docrine, 91 COLUM. L RE%. 473, 478-83 (1991) (providing an
overview of the history of exactions and descriptions ofvarious t)pes of exactions).
3. In this Article, I focus only on the limits imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
relate to the Takings Clause in the Federal Constitution. State law and constitutions may also
place limits on exactions. See, e-g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 651 N.E.2d 380, 387
n.5 (Ill. App. CL 1995) (discussing test for development conditions formulated by the Illinois
Supreme Court); Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Heary George, and Exacaions, 88 COLUM. L PE. 1731,
1731 & nA (1988) [hereinafter Sterk, Nollan, Henay GroagV, and Exactions] (discussing and
providing examples of state law doctrines limiting exactions). These state limits are not
expressly addressed here, although much of my analysis may apply to them as well.
4. For examples, see ALAN A. ALTSCHULER & JOSE A. Go.tEz-ikNE7, REGULATION FOR
REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993); DEVELOPmENT EXACnO.S
(James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987) [hereinafter DEVE.LOPMENT EXACTIONS];
Been, supra note 2; Symposium, Discretionary Limits in Local Lnd.Ue Contro 15 N. IL. U. L
REy. 477 (1995); Symposium, Exactions. A Contotersial New SoureforMunidpil Fund, 50 LAw, &
CONEMP. PROBS. 1 (Richard F. Babcock, Special Ed.) (1987) [hereinafter S)mposium,
Exations]; Symposium, TheJurispnidence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1581 (1988).
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6. Id. at 837.
7. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
8. Id. at 391.
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Taken in combination, these rules require the government to identify
and quantify development-specific negative externalities when it seeks to
obtain a concession of property from a landowner. 9 However, the Court has
not required the underlying land use regulations-the subject of such
bargains-to exhibit a proportionate relationship to the harms they claim to
prevent. 0 Indeed, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes," the Court expressly
disavowed any expansion of Dolan's rough proportionality test beyond the
exactions context. 2 This limitation is understandable; wholesale application
of Dolan to regulatory takingsjurisprudence would abruptly dismantle nearly
seventy-five years of zoning law.'3 Yet Dolan's proportionality rule, thus
limited, represents a logical anomaly. Land use bargains are constrained by
proportionality requirements, while land use decisions made by local
governmental bodies are not.
The result is a conceptual disconnect that has become increasingly
problematic in the years since Nollan and Dolan were decided. 14 The current
state of land use jurisprudence, which couples relatively open-ended
regulatory power with tight restrictions on regulatory bargains, represents
the worst of both worlds. It leaves landowners exposed to excessive land use
regulation while constricting their ability to bargain for regulatory
9. See infra Part IA (providing an overview of the current law); see alsoJan G. Laitos,
Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a
Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 905 (1995) (noting that Dolan requires a relationship between
the exaction and the harm caused by the development); infra note 122 (discussing the
relationship between the nexus and proportionality requirements). Several unanswered
questions about the scope of these decisions have divided lower courts. See Part I.A.1, infra
(discussing these unresolved questions).
10. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("Although in a
general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause, we have not extended
the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.")
(citations omitted); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.") (citations
omitted).
11. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
12. See id. at 702-03 (stating that "the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a
case such as this one"). However, the Court found proper ajury instruction that asked whether
the denial of the development proposal was "reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose."
Id. at 706-08.
13. See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (discussing
justification for governmental zoning powers and explaining that zoning ordinances must be
arbitrary and unreasonable before they can be declared unconstitutional).
14. The Supreme Court dodged an important manifestation of this disconnect when it
denied certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas & O'Connor,_J., dissenting). In that case, the Supreme
Court of Georgia considered whether Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard applied to
legislative "conditions" on development, as well as to conditions imposed through individual
adjudicative negotiations. Id.
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adjustments. Without meaningful constraints on the underlying land use
regulations, limits on land use bargains cannot provide landowners with
protection against overregulation. Instead, these bargaining limits add insult
to injury by preventing mutually beneficial land use deals and generating
vast inefficiencies that harm landowners and communities.'i
I suggest scrapping the bargaining limits contained in Nollan and Dolan,
while using a core insight from these decisions-the relevance of negative
externalities to land use regulation-to formulate a more coherent
alternative. In the course of my analysis, I examine the strategic bargaining
dilemmas that initially triggered the Nollan/Dolan bargaining limits and
suggest a new way of framing and resolving the unconstitutional conditions
problems implicated by land use bargains.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I questions current judicial
limits on land use bargains. After briefly surveying the law, I contend that
the Nollan and Dolan limits represent a logically incoherent but symbolically
significant response to a governmental power that is perceived as
unbounded and deeply threatening.16 To set the stage for a discussion of the
conceptual and practical problems with these limits, I step back and ask why
land use bargains are necessary at all-an inquiry that requires an
examination of both the subject of land use bargains (the underlying
collective property rights embodied in zoning) and the object of these
bargains (the potential gains from trade). Considered against this backdrop,
it is plain that the Nollan and Dolan limits actually shortchange landowners
and can lead to very inefficient results.'
7
15. The potential inefficiency of limits on land use bargains has not gone unnoticed. See
genera/y David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heighened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L REV. 1243
(1997) (discussing ways in which nexus and proportionality rules can diminish allocative
efficiency); William A. Fschel, The Economics of Land Use Exacions: A Ppedy Rights Anays, 50
LAw & Co,rmiP. PROBS. 101, 104-06 (1987) [hereinafter Fischel, The Economis of Land Use
Exactions] (discussing restraints on the alienation of land use entitlements and resulting
inefficiencies); William A. Fischel, Introdudion: Utilitarian Balandng and Formalism in Ta.ings, 88
COLutM. L REV. 1581, 1583 (1988) [hereinafter Fischel, Introduclion) ('Judicial rules that inhibit
these exchanges [between landowners and communities], such as rules against contract zoning,
are barriers to Pareto improvements--that is, voluntary exchanges that leave all parties-the
community, the developer and ultimately the developer's customers-better off.").
16. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narrathies, and Pouwr 88 COLUI. L RE%.
1752 (1988) (discussing the ways in which implicit "narratives of power' have influenced takings
jurisprudence).
17. Because my analysis focuses on the Nollan and Dolan bargaining limits as articulated by
the Supreme Court, I assume (counterfactually) that there is perfect compliance with these
limits. I fully recognize that developers and local governments often engage in transactions that
violate the Nollan and Dolan standards. Such circumvention ameliorates certain problems I
identify here while creating new and different ones. See infra note 109 (discussing
circumvention). Widespread noncompliance with bargaining restrictions powerfully suggests
that the restrictions are inconsistent with the interests of the parties. This inconsistency can be
most plainly seen by focusing, as I do here, on how the limits would operate absent such
circumvention. The fact that the negative impacts of a legal rule may be softened by real-world
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Such inefficiency might be tolerable if the limits did an excellent job of
protecting landowners from the threat of overregulationI and subsequent
"extortion."19 Yet my analysis demonstrates that the Nollan/Dolan limits
cannot provide property owners with any meaningful protection against
overregulation. If there are no enforceable external limits on the
appropriate scope of land use regulation, the requirements of nexus and
proportionality cannot provide a workable backstop. If such external limits
do exist, the nexus and proportionality requirements become unnecessary
and counterproductive. Finally, while nexus and proportionality arguably
prevent underregulation in certain circumstances, they are poorly fitted to
this task and should be replaced with more effective mechanisms.
Part II engages the strategic behavior concerns that animate the current
bargaining limits, and lays the groundwork for developing a more coherent
and effective solution. I begin with an exploration of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as it applies to land use. I maintain that the doctrine
should be regarded as an extension of the structural constraints found
within the Constitution and should focus on what a particular governmental
actor or entity is legally authorized to give and receive. 20 Under this
approach, the constitutionality of a given bargain depends on the
governmental entity's ability or inability to legitimately participate in both
the "giving" and "receiving" parts of the bargaining transaction. Additional
strategic concerns may arise due to the government's market power-a
factor that should be analyzed independently from its role as a promulgator
of regulations. I next examine how an externality-based approach to land
use regulation might, under certain assumptions, resolve constitutionally
problematic behavior while permitting Pareto-efficient land use bargains.
2
'
circumvention provides no principled basis for retaining it over other, more coherent,
alternatives.
18. "Overregulation" is regulation in excess of the socially efficient point. See Been, supra
note 2, at 491 n.93 (citing several reasons why governments overregulate); see also infra Part
I.C.2 (discussing overregulation risks).
19, See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 825, 837 (1987) (stating that a permit
condition which does not bear an essential nexus to the governmental purpose justifying the
development ban is "'an out and out plan of extortion'") (citation omitted).
20. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 4-5 (1993) [hereinafter EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE] (discussing problems with governmental "givings"); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv: 1413, 1489 (1989) (discussing problem
with government receipt of certain rights); infra Part 11A (discussing the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
21. A bargain is Pareto-efficient if it makes at least one party better off and makes no one
worse off. See, e.g., David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 & n.42 (1990). The
resulting distribution, in which at least one party is better off and nobody is worse off, is Pareto-
superior to the pre-bargain allocation. See id. at 16 & n.43. Pareto-optimality is achieved when
no further trades could make any party better off without making at least one party worse off.
CHARL.SJ. GoETz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAWAND ECONOMIcs 248 (1984).
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This discussion suggests possible mechanisms for separating ordinary,
mutually beneficial "hard bargains" between a landowner and the
community, from theft-like strategic manipulations or "real steals."
Part I proposes a new framework for land use entitlements which
would allow unrestricted bargaining over land use. Significantly, my
proposal leaves zoning law in place, while altering its character.Y The
centerpiece of my approach is a mechanism that amounts to an in-kind "call
option'--a species of liability rule that would permit landowners to engage
in otherwise forbidden land uses by providing in-kind remediation of
cognizable negative externalities. Although the idea of using liability rules
to regulate land use is not new,24 my approach differs from standard liability
rules in that it focuses on the in-kind remediation of externalities rather
than the payment of monetary damages. 2 This in-kind call option would
22. A number of scholarly proposals have been designed to foster market (or market-like)
transactions in the land use field, some of which involve abolishing traditional zoning. &e
generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972) [hereinafter SIEGN, LAND
UsEIVITHOUT ZONING] (proposing elimination ofzoning and discussing land use alternatives);
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning Covenan4, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L REv. 681 (1973) (hereinafter Ellickson, Altematives to Zoning] (discussing
liability rules and other alternatives to zoning); Douglas W. Kmiec. Deregnlating Land Use: An
Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L RE%, 28 (1981) (discussing an
alternative to zoning based on land use intensity ratings). Carol Rose has noted that many
market-oriented proposals have had limited practical impact, "perhaps because they would
require a forbidding array of changes in current land use regulatory practice. Carol M. Rose,
Planning and Dealing Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Loca Legitirvieau 71 CAL L REV. 837,
844 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and Dealing].
23. My proposed call option mechanism builds on insights in Ian A)Tes & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coascan Trade, 104 YALE UJ. 1027,
1038-47 (1995), which builds, in turn, on Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's
pathbreaking article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra4 85
HARv. L REv. 1089 (1972). A call option is usually conceptualized as a type of liability rule. e
id. at 1105-06 (discussing liability rules); Madeline Morris, 77e Structure of Entilhmrrnts. 78
CORNELL L REv. 822, 852-54 (1993) (discussing "calls" as a form of liability rule). However, my
call option arrangement could also be recast as an adjustment in the community's property
rights. See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE UJ. 2175, 2178-79 (1997)
[hereinafter Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral] (noting that a liability rule equates to a
"property right subject to an option*); see also infra notes 242-2-14 and accompan)ing text
(discussing alternative conceptual formulations of the call option). Under my proposal, the
landowner's "option" would extend only to land uses that are otherise permissible under
criminal law and non-negotiable public health and safety laws and regulations. For example, a
landowner could maneuver around a zoning restriction specif)ing a particular lot size by using
his call option, but he would hold no option to use his property to commit crimes.
24. SeeEllickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 738-48 (discussing liability rules for
regulating land use); see also Ian Ayres &J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlemets as Autions: Prperty Rulsf
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE LJ. 703, 717-20 (1996) (discussing Ellickson's proposal as
an example of a "second-order liability rule").
25. In this respect, the call option resembles "performance zoning," which allows
developers to engage in desired land uses by meeting certain objective performance standards.
See LANE KENDIG Er Ai-, PERFORMANCE ZONING passim (1980); Frederick W. Acker, Note,
Perforance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363,364 (1991). Under my approach, tie developer
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place a ceiling on the permissible bargaining range while leaving
landowners and governmental entities free to pursue more efficient
alternatives without regard to the Nollan/Dolan limitations. The call option
would itself be alienable as well, allowing communities to effectively buy veto
rights with respect to development on a given parcel of land. This
framework would provide a coherent mechanism for blocking
unconstitutional takings without also blocking socially beneficial bargains.
2 6
I. QUESTIONINGJUDICIAL LIMrTs ON LAND USE BARGAINS
My critique of the bargaining limits articulated in Nollan and Dolan
requires some preliminary groundwork. Section A outlines the substance of
the present judicial limits on land use bargains and considers the symbolic
importance of those limits. Section B, which examines the nature of land use
entitlements and the potential gains associated with land use bargains, sets
the stage for my critique of the nexus and rough proportionality limits. It
also lays the conceptual foundation for the rest of the Article. Section C
contains the heart of my critique. It begins by noting the inefficiencies
associated with blocked bargains, and then considers the ineptness of nexus
and proportionality at confronting the twin problems of overregulation and
underregulation.
A. THE SUBSTANCE AND SYMBOLISM OFJUDICIAL LIMITS
1. An Overview of Current Law
Nollan v. Calfornia Coastal Commission27 and Dolan v. City of Tigard2 3
articulate the basic judicial limits on land use bargains, and their facts and
holdings can be stated with relative simplicity. In Nollan, a landowner sought
to replace a dilapidated beach cottage with a larger home. 29 The California
Coastal Commission attempted to condition its grant of the necessary
is required to remediate all cognizable negative externalities in order to exercise her option, or
she may choose to propose a more efficient alternative to the governmental body. Robert D.
Cooter captures the intuition behind the in-kind call option when he suggests that landowners
be given the choice of mitigating or offsetting harms. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSrrUTION 299-302 (2000). However, he does not develop a mechanism for offering such a
choice. Id. Douglas Kmiec's proposed alternative to zoning also involves in-kind consideration
from developers to local governments but ties the level of "payment" not to the remediation of
externalities, but to the difference between the fair market value of undeveloped land and the
fair market value of the land with a desired land use intensity ("LUI") rating. Kmiec, supra note
22, at 69. Under Kmiec's system, the community establishes schedules of LUI ratings; the
landowner may develop at any desired level of intensity by providing public improvements
equal to the associated difference in land value. Id. at 66-70.
26. My framework contemplates a number of procedural adjustments as well. See infra
notes 264-273 and accompanying text.
27. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
29. Nofan, 483 U.S. at 828.
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building permit on the Nollans' dedication of a public easement across the
portion of their beachfront property lying between the high tide line and
the seawall.50 The Supreme Court struck down this condition on the ground
that it did not bear an "essential nexus" to the cited harm associated with the
larger house-a blocked view of the ocean.31 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, suggested that the Nollans could have been required to provide a
more closely linked land concession, such as a "viewing spot," but
characterized the imposition of an unrelated condition as "an out-and-out
plan of extortion.
In Dolan, the city of Tigard attempted to condition the grant of a
landowner's request to expand her plumbing store on the dedication of a
portion of her land for storm drainage and the construction of a bike path."
Although the Court found an "essential nexus" both between the drainage
measures and the increased runoff associated with the development, and
between the bike path and the increased congestion generated by the
expansion, it found that the concessions had not been shown to be roughly
proportionate to these harms.34 The decision placed the burden of proof
squarely on the city to establish that the concessions in question would
remediate, with some rough degree of precision, the negative externalities
associated with the store's expansion.35
An interesting feature of both decisions is their uneasy treatment of the
underlying land use regulations. While the Court was plainly motivated by a
fear of regulatory excess, the "nexus" and "rough proportionality" standards
articulated in Nollan and Dolan arguably only apply to property exactions.ss
Subsequent case law has struggled to determine whether these standards
operate to more broadly limit land use regulations. It appears that Nollan has
had very little practical impact outside of the bargaining context; courts have
only rarely used its reasoning to invalidate land use regulation.3 7 Likewise, in
30. Id.
31. Id. at 837-42.
32. Id. at 836-37.
33. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380. The condition required the dedication of the portion of Ms.
Dolan's land lying within a one hundred-year floodplain for improvements to a storm drainage
system, as well as a fifteen-foot strip of land lying adjacent to tie floodplain for a bike path. Id.
34. Id. at 387,394-95.
35. Id. at 394-95; see id. at 405 (Stevensj., dissenting) (noting the 'novel burden of proof"
imposed on the city).
36. In Nollan, the Court suggested that a stricter standard than rational basis review
applies to land use regulations. No!an, 483 US. at 834 n.3. However, the Court neither
addressed whether the underlying development restriction in that case met the standard nor
discussed the implications of the standard outside of the bargaining realm. Sr id. at 835
(assuming, without deciding, that legitimate governmental purposes underlay the development
restriction).
37. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supre.e Court Reutatcay
Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FoRDHwtvI ENV.m. LJ. 523,
540-42 (1995) (detailing state court cases interpreting and applying Nolan).
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City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, the Court observed that it had "not
extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context
of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on
the dedication of property to public use. "s8 The Court indicated that the
rough-proportionality test is inapposite when the "landowner's challenge is
based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development."09
The Court left a further, though logically inextricable, question
unanswered when it denied certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of
Atlanta:40 whether Dolan's requirement of rough proportionality applies
when land use "conditions" are not selectively imposed on individual
landowners, but are instead embedded in legislative enactments. 41 As
Richard Epstein has pointed out, any regulatory action other than a simple
head tax can be thought of as conditioning some governmental benefit or
burden on an individual's choice or action,42 making it possible to creatively
recast any land use ordinance as an "exaction." For example, a setback
requirement can be viewed as conditioning permission to build on leaving a
certain swath of land unbuilt. Yet if all land use ordinances can be viewed as
"exactions" subject to the Dolan rule, this would be inconsistent with the
limitation of Dolan articulated in Del Monte Dunes. If the Court is to keep
Dolan's proportionality principle from seeping-indeed, gushing-into the
regulatory takings realm, it must maintain a logically vulnerable distinction
38. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). Although the Court
split on many other issues in the case, it was unanimous in observing that Dolan is confined to
the exactions context. Id.
39. Id. at 703.
40. 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas & O'ConnorJJ.,
dissenting).
41. See id. at 203 n.3 (rejecting application of Dolan proportionality test to legislative
enactment). In Dolan, the Court noted that cases such as Agins v. City of Tibron, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), involved "essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city" which
were distinguishable from the "adjudicative decision" made on Ms. Dolan's permit application.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). Lower courts are in conflict as to the
significance of this distinction. See, e.g., Parking Ass'n of Ga., 515 U.S. at 1117 (Thomas &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802,
811 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the Supreme Court has left unsettled the question whether
Dolan's rough proportionality test applies to legislative, as opposed to administrative
exactions"); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Il. App. Ct. 1995)
(citing with approval Justice Thomas's dissent in Parking Ass'n of Georgia and asserting that "a
municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a
different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property"); see also David L.
Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed
from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing about It, 28 STETSON L.
REv. 523, 572-74 (1999) (collecting cases); Dana, supra note 15, at 1261 n.91 (collecting court
decisions applying nexus and rough proportionality review in contexts other than case-by-case
decisionmaking); Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 242, 252-57 (2000) (discussing confusion in the courts
regarding the legislative/adjudicative distinction).
42. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 11.
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between legislative and adjudicative actions taken by local governmental
bodies.43
Additional uncertainties exist regarding the scope of the Nollan/Dolan
test. Nollan and Dolan both involved actual concessions of land, and neither
case spoke to the status of other kinds of concessions (such as cash payments
or the provision of unrelated amenities). Much of Nollan's reasoning,
including the concern about "extortion,"" would seem equally applicable to
land use conditions of any kind. However, the Nollan Court also observed
that special care was appropriate "where the actual conveyance of property is
made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context
there is a heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective."'* Likewise, in
Dolan, the Court observed that "the conditions imposed were not simply a
limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a
requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city."
46
Drawing a distinction between concessions of land and other kinds of
exactions would be consistent with the distinction drawn in regulatory
takings jurisprudence between ordinary regulations and those governmental
actions that involve actual physical occupation (however slight) .!7 The Tenth
Circuit has used this reasoning to limit the reach of Nollan/Dolan to
concessions of land.48 Analysis in a Ninth Circuit decision, Garneau v. City of
Seattle49 proceeds along similar lines.50 In Garneau, the court noted that the
43. In theory, a broadly applicable legislative enactment might be thought to cany %%ith it
an intrinsic political check that an adjudicative decision would lack. However, where land use
regulation is undertaken in piecemeal fashion by local governmental bodies, there is reason to
question whether the legislative/adjudicative distinction is meaningful. See Rose, Planning and
Dealing, supra note 22, at 846 (stating that "local land use decisions should not be classed as
either 'legislative' or 'judicial'; these rubrics are drmwn from a separation-of-powers doctrine
more appropriate to larger governmental units").
44. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,841 (1986).
45. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
46. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. The Court's statement in Del Monte Dunes that Dolan has not
been extended beyond "land-use decisions conditioning approval on the dedication of pepeny to
public use," City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (emphasis added),
could be read as limiting the rough-proportionality analysis to land concessions. It is not yet
clear how lower courts will interpret this language. The analysis uill likely turn on whether the
phrase "dedication of property" denotes only concessions of real estate, or whether it can be
read more broadly to include the payment of fees.
47. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (noting that permanent
physical invasion is compensable "no matter how minute the intrusion" and explaining that any
other regulation of property is deemed to constitute a taking if it "denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land").
48. See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) ('[le believe
that Noffan and Dolan are best understood as extending the analysis of complete physical
occupation cases to those situations in which the government achieves the same end (i.e., the
possession of one's physical property) through a conditional permitting procedure.").
49. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
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first step in Nollan involved determining whether the exaction taken on its
own, rather than as part of a bargain, would constitute a taking.5' The court
reasoned that if a fee would not constitute a taking when imposed outright,
a bargain involving such a fee could not be viewed as a taking either. This
logic seems to require that the contours of the bargaining limits match those
of takings jurisprudence generally, no matter how nonsensical the latter may
seem.
Other lower courts have demonstrated a willingness to review, and in
appropriate cases invalidate, cash exactions on nexus and proportionality
grounds.5 2 The status of development concessions involving the provision of
unrelated public facilities and amenities not requiring a concession of the
landowner's own land are similarly uncertain. However, it would seem that
any court willing to apply Nollan and Dolan to cash exactions would also be
willing to do so with respect to unrelated public facilities and amenities. 5
The conflicts among courts regarding the reach of Nollan and Dolan
suggest larger conceptual inconsistencies. A decision like Del Monte Dunes,
which recognizes a landowner's right to a jury trial under certain
circumstances, raises the stakes for resolving these inconsistencies. 4 The
50. See generally id. (involving a challenge to Seattle's Tenant Relocation Assistance
Ordinance, which requires landlords to provide cash relocation assistance to tenants displaced
as a result of redevelopment).
51. Id. at812.
52. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996) (plurality
opinion) (concluding that Nollan and Dolan "apply under the circumstances of this case, to the
monetary exaction imposed by Culver City as a condition of approving plaintiff's [rezoning]
request."); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that Nollan and Dolan apply "where the City requires the developer as a
condition of approval to incur substantial costs improving an adjoining street"). The dissent in
Garneau argued that the applicability of Dolan to monetary exactions can be inferred from the
U.S. Supreme Court's action in granting certiorari to summarily vacate and remand the prior
decision in Ehrlich for further consideration in light of Dolan. Garneau, 147 F.3d at 815 & n.5
(O'Scannlain,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ehrlich, 512 U.S. at 1231). See
also Callies, supra note 41, at 568-72 (discussing case law on this point); Mark W. Cordes, Legal
Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 513,54043
(1995) (noting split among commentators and courts on this question); Douglas W. Kmiec,
Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces Into the Takings Puzzle, 38 W/ft. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1036-37 &
n.215 (1997) (discussing the "artificial distinction" drawn by some courts between dedications
and monetary exactions, and citing cases that "lamely" denied heightened scrutiny to the
latter); Nancy E. Stroud, Note, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its
Implications for Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195, 202-06 (1999)
(discussing the split among courts on this point and possible implications of Del Monte Dunes).
53. SeeJerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules For an Old Game? Comments On the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTENIP. L. 3, 34 (1991)
(stating that Nollan "threatens to prohibit exercises of the technique (incentive zoning) for
unrelated amenities").
54. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 722-23 (1999). The Court
declined to engage in a "precise demarcation of the respective provinces ofjudge and jury in
determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate governmental
interests." Id. at 722. Nevertheless, the possibility of presenting one's case to ajury on such land
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confusion surrounding the scope of Nollan and Dolan is not surprising. As I
will show, the limits articulated in these decisions make no sense within the
bargaining context and are, in fact, harmful to landowners. Nexus and
proportionality standards might be logically applied to land use regulation
generally (although the results might be undesirable as a normative
matter), 5 but the Court is apparently unviling to allow these rules to
overrun decades of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
2. Fear and Loathing in ExactionsJurisprudence
The Nollan/Dolan rules are perhaps best understood as a highly visible
symbolic protest against governmental excess. The decisions proved so
psychologically gratifying for landowners that few property-rights advocates
have been willing to look behind the decisions' anti-government rhetoric to
consider their true impact on property rights and on the community.
Though Nollan and Dolan do not overtly attack zoning, both decisions are
plainly steeped in skepticism about the legitimacy of regulatory action in the
land use arena. With zoning almost inalterably installed in the American
legal landscape, angst about the associated regulatory encroachments into
property rights had long been sublimated. The bargaining context provided
an opportunity to voice the pent-up frustrations of the nation's landholders
and to strike a strong moral victory against what was perceived as the
virtually unstoppable regulatory power of government.
It is impossible to discuss these decisions meaningfully without
considering their psychological and symbolic importance for landowners. As
William Fischel has observed, the intangible aspects of a decision like Nollan
create a curious blind spot about the practical effects of its legal rule:
[P]ointing out that Nollan might actually harm development
interests does not go over well in prodevelopment circles. I thought
initially that those I spoke with did not understand the logic of the
argument, but later it dawned on me what the importance of Nollan
was. Development-minded landowners had at last won their case in
use issues is likely to increase the volume of litigation. SezDavid G. SavageJuries OK'd in Land
Development Cas, LA. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A25 (quotingJohn D. Echeverria, who predicts
the case will "encourage more burdensome and costly litigation against local governments over
land-use issues").
55. 1 treat nexus and proportionality as a package here, though nexus might be thought to
follow proportionality automatically in this context. It is difficult to imagine a regulation that is
.proportionate" to the harm caused by a given land use, but which fails to address the harm or
harms to which it is proportionate.
56. I am not the first to recognize the aptness of Hunter S. Thompson's signature phrase
in the land use context. See, for example, Michael B. Gerrard, Far and lAthzng in the Sting of
Hazardous and Radioactive Wzste Faciliies: A Comrhnsiwe Apar-th to a Misprreetird Cnsu, 68 TUL
L REv. 1047 (1994); Robert L Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KM,. L
REV. 647 (1997); Mi tchell F. Disney, Note, Fear and Loathing on the Californ Ciaslhne Are Coastal
Commission Property Exactions Constitutional?, 14 PEeP. L REv. 357 (1987).
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the U.S. Supreme Court.57
Justice Scalia's assertion that the Nollan exaction constituted "an out-
and-out plan of extortion"58 resonated powerfully with many property
owners. Nollan tells a story of governmental coercion, trickery, and abuse of
power. 59 It is not surprising that multitudes of property owners cheered
when the Court drew the line on government and stepped in to defend a
beleaguered individual.
The majority opinion in Dolan does not accuse the city of Tigard of
extortion, yet the Court's insistence on detailed proof of the quantity of
harm and remediation associated with a particular land use bargain is
consistent with Nollan's view of government officials as opportunistic
"villains."60 Putting the government to a mathematical accounting of its
justification for offering a particular land use bargain suggests that
government is not to be trusted. Governmental bodies are stealthy, greedy,
and deceitful, Dolan seems to say, and someone had better be minding the
store.
Land use bargains provide a particularly propitious focus for popular
fears of single-mindedly acquisitive and manipulative governmental bodies.
As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that the term used to designate the
landowner's concession in the land use bargain-"exaction'-is not just
heavily loaded but is actually a synonym for "extortion. " 61 While some
concessions of land or other benefits may be the result of inappropriate
bargaining leverage, 62 the choice of the word "exaction" as a generic term
57. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 61-62 (internal cross-reference
omitted); see Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 479, 481 (1995) [hereinafter Epstein, Harms and Benefits] (noting that the Nollan case "was
born of defiance and frustration"); Fischel, Introduction, supra note 15, at 1597 ("Nexus is one of
those 'tokens' to which Michelman refers that reminds us that there is some line between
private and public activity.") (footnote omitted); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1600, 1628 (1988) (suggesting that illogical doctrines in takings jurisdiction "can still
make sense ideologically as tokens of the limitation of government").
58. The extortion language used byJustice Scalia originally appeared in a New Hampshire
Supreme Court opinion. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1986) (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12,14-15 (N.H. 1981)); seeBeen, supra note 2, at 475 &
n.14 (citing cases using "extortion" and similar expressions).
59. Alexander, supra note 16, at 1764-67. This is not the only story that might emerge from
a land dispute, of course. See id at 1767-68 (discussing a counter-narradve in which private
landowners are powerful and manipulative); David Mendell & Gary Washburn, Neighbors Win I
Over Goliath, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2000, at N1 (discussing community's zoning victory over
"powerful, well-heeled development interest").
60. Alexander, supra note 16, at 1771.
61. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "exaction" as "[t]he
wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or reward for his
services, under color of his official authority, where no payment is due" and directing readers to
"[slee also Extortion"); Symposium, Exactions, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting WEBSrER'S NINTH NEv
COLLEGIATE DIcTiONARY431 (1986)).
62. SeeinfraPartIl.
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for all land use transactions amounts to a linguistic stacking of the deck.63
One does not ordinarily think of an "exaction" as something in which two
parties mutually participate; rather, it connotes something done by one
(powerful) party to another (powerless) party. The possibility that the
landowner might get something valuable out of such a deal, or perhaps even
participate in it voluntarily, is entirely ignored. The assumption that the
power relationship is inherently one-sided and exploitative subtly influences
judicial perceptions of the relevant legal issues." With a starting point like
that, the judicial use of terms such as "extortion" to describe land use
bargains seems unsurprising.
65
This linguistic treatment of regulatory bargains no doubt reflects a
belief that the underlying land use regulation is unfair and coercive to start
with, making it no "bargain" to have it lifted at any price in excess of zero.
66
If cities can tighten zoning regulations with relative impunity,6 one might
expect them to strategically overregulate land use to gain bargaining
leverage. This is precisely what Justice Scalia suggests in Nollan.! The same
risk exists any time the party selling the right to violate rules is the same
party making the rules. If the government can make rules costlessly, it can
63. The volume of existing scholarship and court opinions using this term has
confounded my efforts to eliminate it from this Artide idthout sacrificing clarity. If it is too late
in the day to switch to a more neutral word, such as "concession" or "in-kind payment." it is at
least necessary to consciously strip the inapt term "exaction" or its negative connotations. Se
DrEvLOPMENT ExAcrioNs, supra note 4, at 3-4 (explaining decision to continue use of the word
"exactions" despite its negative connotations).
64. SeeAlexander, supra note 16, at 1753 ("Takings doctrine is shaped by striking pictures
and powerful metaphors... about who holds power and how those who hold power use iL).
65. See, eg., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (providing an
example of such language); William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912, 914
(W.D. Ark. 1990) (stating that without a showing of externalities relating to planned expansion,
"the condition which the City attaches to building permits is simple extortion"); Outdoor Sys. v.
City of Mesa, 819 P.2d 44,53 (Ariz. 1991) (Cameron,J., dissenting) ("To require the lando'ner
to give up what he is legally permitted to have in order to obtain what he may already be
entitled to, is bureaucratic extortion, if notjudicial extortion."); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1070 (N.Y. 1989) ("Permitting the omers to avoid the illegal
confiscation by paying a 'ransom' cannot make it lawful.").
66. See FISCHEL, REGULATORYTAKINGs, supra note 2, at 344-5 (arguing that the problem
with the bargain invalidated in Nolian was that people did not view Nollan's proposed use-a
larger house-as an illegitimate land use that should require special permission).
67. Zoning may lack a meaningful political check, as it often burdens those who are not
yet residents of the community-for example, those planning to move into a new development.
See generally Fischel, The Economics of Land UseExactions, supra note 15, at 107 (noting that zoning
may burden non-residents). It has also traditionally received a relatively low level ofjudicial
review. See geneally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 US. 255 (1980); 'ill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). However, this may be changing as the reasoning of cases like
Nollan and Dolan seeps into the analysis of the underl)ing regulations, and as cases like Del
MonteDunes suggest a broader role for fact-finding in assessing regulatory action.
68. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5.
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sell violation rights to members of the populace for pure profit.69 The
resulting potential for redistribution from landowners to government (and
thence to the politically powerful members of the community) is obvious.70
The rules formulated in Nollan and Dolan amount to an inarticulate cry of
protest against such unchecked excesses.
Antipathy against government action is not always unjustified, and
governmental bodies are plainly capable of strategic action. Moreover,
outrage and demoralization may be legitimate touchstones in takings
71jurisprudence. Yet Nollan and Dolan, despite their symbolic force, fail to
generate coherent or effective legal rules. In fact, their holdings leave
landowners with less autonomy and with a diminished bundle of property
rights. They exact a heavy price in inefficiency while utterly failing to deliver
on their promise to landowners.
B. THE BENFITS OFBARGAINS
Before I unpack the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the
essential nexus and rough proportionality standards, I would like to step
back and consider the need for land use bargains in the first place. This
inquiry requires a close look at both the subject and the object of land use
bargains.
1. The Subject of the Bargain: Property Entitlements in Zoning
In order to understand why land use bargains become necessary at all,
and why limits on them can be costly, it is first necessary to examine the
nature of the collective property rights created through zoning.72 Zoning
splits property rights between the individual landowner and the local
government by vesting a set of collective property rights in the community.
73
69. See Kayden, supra note 53, at 3 ("Faced with mounting social needs and continuing
fiscal constraints, more and more cities 'mint' money through their zoning codes to finance a
wide array of public amenities."). Creating and selling new rules is actually much more efficient
than minting money would be, since the creation of additional rules channels dollars from
landowners to the local government without diluting their value.
70. SeeBeen, supra note 2, at 491 (discussing the potential for abuse if the government can
sell violation rights).
71. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on theEthical Foundations
of Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967) thereinafter Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness] (discussing the "demoralization costs" associated with takings); id.
at 1228 (discussing the physical invasion test by reference to the fact that "[t]he psychological
shock, the emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all property and security, may be expected
to reach their highest pitch when government is an unabashed invader").
72. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERIGAN
SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 1, 15-18 (1977) (describing zoning as a collective property
right). In this Article, I use the term "zoning" as shorthand for all forms of land use regulation.
73. For present purposes, "the community" can be thought of in simplistic terms as
incorporating the preferences of everyone in the relevant area except for the individual
landowner in question. Later, I will introduce the complications presented when the interests of
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These collective property rights allow the community some degree of
control over the landowner's use of her own land. While traditional notions
of nuisance grant the community some power to limit land use, zoning shifts
certain additional property rights from the landowner to the community.
7 4
Thus, under current zoning law, the community's interest in maintaining a
particular atmosphere or growth pattern is protected by a property rule.7' A
landowner cannot simply choose to violate a land use regulation and pay for
the damage caused, as she could under a liability rule, but instead must
obtain permission from the community before proceeding with any
nonconforming use. As long as the land use regulation furthers a legitimate
government interest, the community can refuse to grant this permission.
the politically dominant portions of the community in charge or the regulatory apparatus
diverge from the interests of a minority segment of the community. The simplified version will
typically conform to reality where a relatively homogenous neighborhood engages in land use
regulation. See id. at 16 ("Although zoning rights are held by local government, in all except a
very few instances, local legislatures can be counted on to follow te residents' wishes in
administering the zoning of a neighborhood.*).
74. See William A. Fischel, Equity and Effidenuy Aspeds of Zoning fona, 27 PUB. POL" 301,
302 (1979) [hereinafter Fischel, ZoningRefonn] (noting that zoning transfers "property rights or
'entitlements' from those who own undeveloped land ('the landowners') to other community
residents (the 'community')").
75. See Fschel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions, supra note 15, at 110 (discussing the
distinction between property rules and liability rules articulated in Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 23, at 1105-06). Granting the community a property right is not the only possible
arrangement. See Ellickson, Altematives to Zoning supm note 22, at 711-38 (discussing the use of
other legal rules, including nuisance remedies and covenants, to regulate land use); infra Part
III (offering a new framework for land use bargains).
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Figure 1 illustrates the various ways in which entitlements in a piece of
land might be divided between the owner of that piece of land and the
community. The horizontal axis represents the restrictiveness of the
regulations placed on the land." The possibilities range from the extreme of
.no restriction" at the far left, to the opposite extreme, "no uses permitted,"
at the far right. Each point on the axis corresponds to a possible way in
which entitlements might be split between the landowner and the
community. In each instance, it would be possible to draw a vertical line to
represent the allocation of entitlements; the portion of the line falling in the
white area would represent the entitlement in the land that is held
collectively by the community, and the portion of the line failing in the gray
area would represent the landowner's remaining property rights in the land.
In a world with no restrictions, the landowner has full rights to use the land
in any imaginable way, while in a world where all uses are prohibited, the
community holds full rights to the land.
Although it is possible to imagine infinitely fine degrees of
restrictiveness along the horizontal axis and a correspondingly large number
of vertical lines representing divisions of property rights, it is helpful to focus
on a few benchmarks. The first dashed vertical line, labeled "nuisance law,"
captures the intuition that, even under common law doctrines of nuisance,
the landowner's right to use her land as she likes is conditioned by a certain
set of collectively held entitlements. 7 Specifically, the community holds the
rights with respect to what I have termed "noxious uses," represented in
Figure I by the area above the top dashed horizontal line. If nuisance law
represented the only restraint on land use, the community would control
the rights to "noxious uses," while the landowner would retain the right to
make any other use of her land she wished, whether "intensive" or
"innocuous."
76. The idea of graphically representing a "restriction index" is borrowed from i1liam
Fischel. Fischel, Zoning Reforn, supra note 74, at 304 fig.1; FISCH.EL, REGULVTORY T, 1.I¢5, supra
note 2, at 343 fig.9.1. My graphical formulation suggests that regulation ahss operates to
restrict the intensity of development. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not alwas the case. For
example, I observed one neighborhood zoning meeting in Chicago in which local business
owners opposed a residential proposal because it would not help to generate additional traffic
through the area-in other words, interested property owners sought to ban the tise for being
insufficiently intensive. Nevertheless, land use regulations typically operate with increasing
force against increasingly intensive land uses, making Figure 1 a helpful approximation of
reality.
77. See Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 311 (noting that nuisance law could be
invoked to prevent certain land uses).
78. The terms "noxious," "intensive," and "innocuous" do not carry seif-evident meanings,
and reasonable minds may differ as to the quantity of uses falling into each or these categories.
They are, however, convenient labels for purposes of illustration. This is obviously not the only
possible Ay of dividing up the universe of land uses. See FISCHEL, REGULIATORY TAJNGS, supra
note 2, at 353 fig.9.2 (dividing the spectrum of possible land uses into categories labeled
"subnormal," "normal," and "supernormal").
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The three dashed vertical lines labeled Zl, Z2, and Z3 represent
possible divisions of entitlements under three different zoning regimes.
These lines appear to the right of the line designated "nuisance law,"
reflecting the reality that zoning ordinances regulate a broader range of uses
than would be prohibited by nuisance law.79 Under the zoning regime
designated by Z2, the community holds the rights to all intensive uses as well
as the rights to all noxious uses, while the landowner retains only the right to
use his property for innocuous purposes. A looser regulatory scheme, ZI,
preserves the landowner's rights with respect to some intensive uses. Under
a harsher regulatory regime, Z3, the authority over some innocuous uses has
been transferred from the landowner to the community. At some
indeterminate point short of complete prohibition of all uses, the regulation
would be deemed to have gone "too far," and, unless compensated, would
be invalidated as an unconstitutional "taking."0
2. The Object of the Bargain: Potential Gains from Trade
Because zoning law is usually based on the subjective views of a political
majority about the desirability of various land uses, it is unlikely to provide
the most efficient initial allocation of entitlements between the landowner
and the community. For example, a community might choose the
regulatory regime corresponding to Z3, even though a shift from Z3 to Z2
would generate gains for the landowner in excess of the losses to the
community. Here, I am assuming that "the community" does not internalize
the costs and benefits experienced by the individual landowner in
79. Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 317-18. Although zoning is often rationalized
by analogizing to nuisance law, "zoning provides the community with a far larger and more
diverse bundle of entitlements than even the most generous definition of actionable nuisances."
Id. at 318.
80. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."); see
also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("Where the state seeks to sustain
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."). Whether or
not Z3 would be viewed as going "too far" would depend on the legitimacy of the state interests
advanced to ban certain innocuous uses, and whether the remaining permissible uses were
economically viable.
81. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1269 ("[O]ver-regulation may benefit the dominant
political majority even though it does not maximize the welfare of the community as a whole.").
Of course, zoning regulations may not reflect the interests of a majority at all, but may instead
be the result of "rent-seeking" by powerful interest groups. Rent-seeking occurs when parties try
to convince the government to intervene in the market in ways that will allow those parties to
attain above-market returns. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode, 86 CoI.uh . L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
When regulation is influenced in this manner, the initial allocation of property rights might be
expected to diverge even further from the social optimum.
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question.S If the initial allocation of property rights were set at the social
optimum (taking into account the preferences of everyone in the relevant
community, including the individual landowner), land use bargains would be
wholly unnecessary, there would be no mutually advantageous trades
available. Where the initial allocation diverges from the optimum, Pareto
improvements can be achieved through bargaining. Figure 2, adapted from
Fischel, shows how this might work.83
82. See supra note 73 (assuming initially that "die community" incorporates the
preferences of everyone in the relevant area except for the individual landoner in question).
83. See Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 325 fig.2. My anal)sis in working through
Figure 2 draus heavily on Fischel's work. However, my formulation differs in two important
respects from the analysis employed by Fischel. First, I explicitly incorporate the intuition that
in the absence of outside constraints or strategic motives, a community will a th-y choose
regulatory point A-the point at which no further marginal benefits can be derived from
additional regulations. Second, my graph explicitly takes account of the fact that further
regulations are possible beyond this point (an intuition to be developed further in Figure 3.
infra), and that the community might continue regulating well into this costly regulatory range
for purely strategic reasons.
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In Figure 2, as in Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents a continuum
of regulatory regimes, from least restrictive to most restrictive. Put
differently, each point on the horizontal axis represents a different division
of entitlements between the individual landowner and the community. The
vertical axis represents benefits, measured in dollars.8' The downward
sloping curve represents the marginal benefits to the community as the
regulatory regime becomes increasingly restrictive. Significantly, the
preferred regulatory point of the community will not necessarily correspond
to the point that would maximize overall social utility, which would take the
individual landowner's utility into account as well. Indeed, the graphs and
examples in this Article assume that the community's preferred regulatory
regime will be more restrictive than the socially optimal point.
In Figure 2, the community's downward sloping marginal benefit curve
captures the assumption that, up to a point, adding further land use
restrictions generates additional benefits for the community (though at a
decreasing rate), 5 Beyond point A, further restrictions generate no
additional marginal benefits for the community, and in fact generate
marginal costs.36 The other curve, read from right to left, represents the
decreasing marginal benefits which the landowner enjo) as restrictions are
loosened. Because increased restrictiveness represents foregone marginal
benefits for the landowner, the landowner's curve, read from left to right,
represents the landowner's marginal opportunity costs.s
Point B represents an efficient allocation of entitlements between the
community and the landowner. At that point, the marginal cost of the
regulations to the landowner precisely matches the marginal benefit to the
community. The landowner would not be able to pay off the community to
loosen the restrictions, nor would the community be able to pay the
landowner to further restrict his activities.88 For example, imagine a
neighborhood zoned for low-density residential housing. This zoning regime
corresponds to point B with respect to a given parcel of land only if the
84. Of course, benefits may be tangible or intangible, monetary or nonmonetar). They
may include, for example, aesthetic or social value. For simplicity, however, I am assuming that
the relevant benefits can be translated into dollar units.
85. See Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 304.
86. As is made explicit in Figure 3, at this point the community's total benefits begin to
decline as a result of regulation.
87. Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 325 fig.2. I have replaced Fischel's slightly
curving lines with straight lines for the sake of simplicity, and have extended the ends of the
curves below the horizontal axis to illustrate that overly restrictive regulations will at some point
prove costly for the community, and that the loosening of regulations %ill at some point prove
costly to the landowner. The precise shape of the marginal cost and benefit curves is an
empirical question that will vary from landowner to landowner and from community to
community.
88. See id. at 305 (stating that there is a 'maximum benefit assignment' where "[n]either
party can bribe the other to accept more or fewer restrictions").
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marginal opportunity costs to the landowner from further restrictions (say, a
two-acre minimum lot size) would be larger than the marginal gains to the
community as a whole, and if loosening restrictions (to, say, allow small
retail stores) would impose costs on the community that are larger than the
benefits accruing to the landowner.
However, it is quite possible that the low-density residential zoning
restriction is inefficiently restrictive with respect to a given parcel (or has
become inefficient over time), and thus corresponds not to point B, but to
point A. In fact, A is the point we would expect the community to select, in
the absence of political anomalies or judicial constraints on regulation, and
in the absence of strategic motives. Suppose this is the case, and that a
landowner, Ambrose, would now like to construct a gas station on his
property. Such construction would require a regulatory change that
corresponds to a shift on the horizontal axis from point A to point B. This
shift will increase the land's value to him by $800,000, while it will only
decrease the benefits accruing to the community by $300,000. In other
words, Ambrose incurs marginal costs from this regulation far in excess of
the benefits enjoyed by the community, and he would benefit from a
rollback to the point B regulatory regime far more than the rollback would
cost the community.
The total area under the landowner's cost curve between points A and
B (area X plus area Y in Figure 2) represents the benefits accruing to
Ambrose as a result of the zoning change ($800,000). However, Ambrose
must at least compensate the community for the losses it will incur as a result
of the regulatory change, which is the amount represented by area Y
($300,000). Area X represents the surplus of $500,000 generated by the
zoning change, which, in the absence of applicable constraints, is destined
to be the subject of aggressive bargaining.s 9 Unless the deal is blocked by law
or abnormally high transaction costs, Ambrose and the community will
probably reach some sort of agreement. Even if the community drives a very
hard bargain and captures some of the surplus represented by X, as long as
there is enough remaining to compensate Ambrose for his trouble, he can
be expected to go through with the transaction.90 The result is Pareto-
efficient-the zoning change is made and the gas station is built.
As this example suggests, individual landowners would wish to purchase
relevant portions of the collective property rights created through zoning
whenever they stand to gain more from the exchange than the community
stands to lose. Under such conditions, the land use "winner" can
compensate the "losers" and still come out ahead. The need for such
transactions is palpable, because the initial allocation of collective property
rights under zoning is not generated by market forces and often bears little
89. See id. at 326 (discussing potential bargaining dynamics).
90. See id.
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relationship to the actual and evolving demands of the population. Because
information about true preferences is unavailable, even the most public-
minded regulatory body would be unable to determine the optimum initial
allocation of property rights.91 Where the purpose behind planning is to
protect property values or serve the interests of politically powerful groups,
rather than to provide the community with its desired mix of land uses, the
initial allocation can be expected to diverge quite sharply from that which a
market economy would generate.92
Of course, collective land use rights created by zoning are not freely
transferable.93 This limitation is usually explained by reference to the legal
justifications for zoning. While traditional notions of nuisance offer some
support for land use regulations, the far-reaching regulations found in
zoning codes have, since ldlage of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,m been justified
on police power grounds.95 In addition, local governments are deemed to
have a legitimate interest in comprehensive land use planning, a rationale
that has provided support for all manner of land use restrictions.5
These "police power" and "planning" justifications are logically
incompatible with the sale of zoning rights.9 Justice Scalia hinted at this
incompatibility in Nollan by presenting a hypothetical involving the sale of
the right to violate an unquestionably valid exercise of the police power-a
91. See id at 316 (discussing incentives for communities and developers to misstate the
costs associated with development, making the "establishment of an efficient degree of
restriction ... largely a matter of guesswork").
92. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 10-15 (noting that zoning originated as a means for
protecting the property values of the affluent). Nelson analogizes the zoning of available land
to governmentally-imposed automobile production quotas mandating highly unrealistic
proportions of Rolls Royces and Cadillacs. Id. at 105. Critics of zoning have long noted that it
interferes with the satisfaction of consumer demand. See generally SIEGAN, LAND USE WiT'oHr
ZONING, supra note 22 (proposing elimination of zoning to better match consumer demand).
93. See Mun. Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804 (App. Div. 1937)
("Zoning benefits are not cash items."); NELSON, supra note 72, at 2 ('Unlike most other
property rights, [zoning rights] have never been legally salable.").
94. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
95. See id at 387-88 (noting that "the law of nuisances... may be consulted, not for the
purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process ofascertaining the
scope of, the [police] power"); see also Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968) ("Zoning
is not just an expansion of the common law of nuisance."), quoted in SIEQ.%N, LA'D USE
WITHOUT ZONING, supra note 22, at 1.
96. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 27 ("[N]uisance-law rationales for neighborhood zoning
could not offer a good justification for community zoning, but the planning theory of zoning
was able to fill the gap.").
97. &eY City ofNewYork v. 17 Vista Assocs., 599 N.Y.S.2d 549,552 (1993) ("It is not for any
governmental agency, like Chaucer's Pardoner, to sell indulgences.'); NESON, supra note 72, at
84 (observing that the sale of zoning rights seems unsuitable "as an exercise of the police
power" and unethical "as an instrument for the implementation of public land-use plans");
Fischel, Zoning Reforr, supra note 74, at 327 ("Selling zoning, as long as this [police powier)
rationale persists, is analogous to selling health inspections to restaurants, elevator safety
certification to apartment houses, and licenses to speed to automobile operators.").
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ban on shouting "fire" in a crowded theater.9s Scalia was making a point
about nexus, but the hypothetical carries an important subtext: if something
is important enough to justify a ban on police power grounds, violation
rights should not be for sale on the open market.9 Put another way, the fact
that a community is willing to sell the right to violate a given regulation
provides a strong indication that the regulation does not constitute a true
exercise of the police power.100
If zoning really constituted an exercise of the police power on the same
order as a ban on shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, this objection might
have some bite. However, zoning was designed to do something quite
different-protect property values and neighborhood environments. 0' The
planning and police power justifications were largely ad hoc rationalizations
• 102
concocted to achieve this goal. These fictions were remarkably palatable to
the Village of Euclid Court,'03 but they have left a bitter aftertaste. Land use
regulations are quite different from traditional exercises of police power,
and their character as property entitlements held by the community should
be explicitly acknowledged.
In any event, zoning generates a desire for land use transactions without
allowing those transactions to occur freely-a fundamentally unstable
arrangement.1' 4 Aside from the usual corrupt responses that this kind of
impediment elicits,l °s landowners and governmental entities have
98. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
99. See Kayden, supra note 53, at 7 (discussing criticism of "incentive zoning" as a form of
"sanctioned bribery, abiding a private sector that can 'buy' its way out of legal restrictions").
100. See id. at 42 n.140 ("When government willingly allows an exception to the 'shout fire'
ban, for a related or unrelated $100 contribution, it intrinsically demonstrates that the ban itself
is not strictly necessary.").
101. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 174-75 ("Although long explained as an exercise of
police powers, most applications of zoning laws clearly have little to do with protections of
health, safety, or morals."); id. at 11-15 (discussing zoning's role in protecting neighborhood
quality and property values).
102. See id. at 128 ("Although zoning was justified as a method of nuisance control and as
an instrument for implementing public plans, both of these justifications were largely fictions
that camouflaged zoning's actual purposes."); SIDNEY BROWER, GOOD NEIGHBORHOODS: A
STUDY OF IN-TOWN AND SUBURBAN REsIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS 43 (1996) ("Arguments in favor
of comprehensive planning in the early twentieth century were really arguments for social
segregation.") (citations omitted).
103. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Ni.ilSON, 5supra note
72, at 14 ("The essential protection that zoning provided for the newly emerging suburban
neighborhoods of the prosperous is a possible explanation for the surprising approval granted
to it by the conservative Supreme Court of the 1920s.").
104. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 51 ("Creating collective property rights without also
establishing an adequate mechanism for transfer of those rights when needed to allow for
changes in land use has had very unhappy consequences for land development.").
105. See id. at 87 ("In many cases, sale of zoning rights has benefited not any neighborhood
residents but corrupt local zoning administrators, who have succumbed to the enormous
financial pressures for transitions in use that zoning inflexibility can provide."); SIEGAN, LAND
USE WITHOUT ZONING, supra note 22, at 196 ("Zoning procedures are particularly susceptible to
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predictably attempted to formulate bargains that will allow them to share the
surplus associated with a zoning change. One common approach is a form
of barter, in which the landowner trades something (often a piece of her
own land) for the right to use the balance of her land in a particular way.
These are the types of transactions that received close judicial scrutiny in
Nollan and Dolan. While more cumbersome than straightfonard cash deals,
such transactions would be expected to effect societal gains by moving
development rights into the hands of those who value them most highly.
For example, perhaps Ambrose's community would be willing to permit
the zoning change if Ambrose would agree to construct an indoor swimming
pool on a portion of his land. Community members feel that the
opportunity to take a healthy swim each day would more than compensate
them for having to endure the fumes and traffic generated by the gas
station. Ambrose will agree to the deal because he can install the pool on a
portion of his land for $400,000 (counting the lost value of the land). While
this "barter" deal may create less of a social surplus than the cash payment
would (if, as is likely, the community values the pool less than it will cost
Ambrose),106 it still leads to an efficient use of the land.
C. THE ICOHEREVCE OFNEXUSAN\)PROPORTIOVALrFY
Fearful of the strategic possibilities associated with open-ended
bargaining, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the content of land use
bargains. Indeed, the swimming pool deal Ijust described would be blocked
under Nollan, because the dedication of land for a swimming pool does not
bear an essential nexus to the harms that would justify prohibiting the gas
station in the first place. 0 7 The encroachment on bargaining freedom
associated with these judicial limits is not trivial.' s Rather, the limits on
bargaining imposed by Nollan and Dolan can be expected to block a large
category of mutually beneficial land use transactions.1 9 Nor is this
graft."); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, spra note 22, at 701 (discussing frequenc) of
corruption and other forms of"special influence").
106. Barter arrangements often embody such inefficiencies. Fischel, Zoning Rfm. supra
note 74, at 307 ("The range of tradable goods is limited and may be subject to indivisibilities,
and the value of the gift to the community may be less than the cost to tie donor.").
107. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring an essential
nexus beneen the purpose of permit conditions and the purpose of the development ban).
108. Indeed, the limits have spawned at least one laws review article dedicated to outright
circumvention. See generally Douglas T. Kendall &James E. Ryan, "Paying for the Ciuange Using
Eminent Domain to Secire Exactions and Sidetep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L REV. 1801 (1995).
The Kendall/Ryan proposal involves taking land through eminent domain, and then offering
the landowner a choice between cash compensation and a development permit. Il at 1803.
The authors admit that this approach is "not obviously constitutional." h/L at 180-1.
109. This assumes that the bargaining limits have operative force. It is possible that. as a
practical matter, developers and local governments will find ways around the legal rules. See
Dana, supra note 15, at 1286-99 (discussing circumvention of nexus/rough proportionality
review). For example, a developer may tolerate conditions that fail to meet the Xdlan/DM!an
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impediment to trade justified on the ground that it will prevent
overregulation. While nexus and proportionality do too much by blocking
advantageous bargains, they also do too little by failing to provide
meaningful protection against government overreaching. Finally, nexus and
proportionality are not well-tailored to attack the opposite problem-
underregulation-which can leave certain segments of the population
exposed to unremediated externalities.
1. Blocked and Inefficient Exchanges
To illustrate how the nexus and proportionality limits might block
socially valuable exchanges (or, at best, make them less efficient), consider
how conditions featuring nexus and proportionality would play out in
Ambrose's situation. First, the community would need to formulate
conditions that related to the harms that would justify rejecting Ambrose's
proposal. For example, the community might require a fume-absorbing
buffer of trees, a sound-absorbing wall, and street improvements to
compensate for the increased traffic flow. Second, such conditions would
need to be matched with rough precision to the magnitude of harm caused
by the proposed development. Considered in this light, it might seem that
conditions meeting the nexus and proportionality requirements would leave
the community indifferent to the development. If the conditions only make
up for the harms caused by the development, and if (as we will assume for
the moment) the development itself generates no benefits for the
community, the nexus and proportionality conditions leave the community
no better off than it would be if it simply rejected the proposal. Under these
assumptions, the community would have no incentive to approve the zoning
change. Where imposing the conditions will also involve transaction costs for
the community, such as the weighty burdens of proof imposed by Dolan,
n0
the community would clearly be better off to simply reject Ambrose's
proposal at the outset."'
criteria when it is a "repeat player" that expects to interact again with the local government. Id.
at 1288; see Frederik Jacobsen & Craig McHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS 342, 348 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978)
[hereinafter WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTsI ("Since developers are more concerned with cost than
with constitutional theory, they will often agree to exactions that are not valid but cost less than
a court challenge."). The empirical prevalence of circumvention is symptomatic of theoretical
problems with the bargaining limits themselves; such theoretical problems are the focus of my
analysis.
110. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (stating that the "city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
111. I am assuming that the community could refuse to grant the zoning variance necessary
for the project to go forward. This is the case under current law, see supra note 79, as long as the
regulation upon which the refusal is based does not go so far as to amount to a "taking." It
would be possible to formulate a system of land use that did not grant the community this veto
power, of course. See infra note 239 (noting that community would not have veto power if its
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Interestingly, this is true whether the nexus and proportionality
conditions would be cheap or expensive for the landowner to fulfill. A
solution that involves remediating all negative externalities usually will be
relatively expensive. However, let us assume, counterfactually, that it is
tremendously cheap; it will cost Ambrose only $100,000. Because Ambrose
stands to be made $800,000 better off by the zoning change, this would
generate a surplus of $700,000 for him. However, if we assume that this
remediation makes the community no better off than it would be without
the development (i.e., that it perfectly remediates the $300,000 worth of
harm the community would otherwise suffer as a result of the development),
the community has no incentive to agree to the deal. If we further assume
that it will cost the community $20,000 to prove proportionality, as it must
do under Dolan, the resulting bargain would generate a $20,000 net loss for
the community. Even though Ambrose has access to a large surplus and
would be more than willing to share a portion of it with the community, the
nexus and proportionality rules prevent it. The community would be
irrational not to reject the proposal outright, as it has every legal right to do
under current law. The result, of course, is shockingly inefficient.
It is possible, however, that our earlier assumption was incorrect and
that the development would actually generate benefits for the community,
whether in the form of an increased tax base or more convenient living
conditions. An interesting and conceptually important feature of Dolan's
brand of proportionality is that it does not require an offset for community
benefits generated by the development itself , Were it not for the surplus
generated for the community by the development itself, the nexus and
proportionality requirements could be expected to operate in a manner
virtually indistinguishable from an outright ban on all land use bargains.11 4
However, the fact that the community need not offset development harms
with development benefits when assessing proportionality has devastating
implications for the efficacy of the bargaining limits." 5 There are two
interests were protected only by a liability rule).
112. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 689 ('It will rarely be efficient to
eliminate all nuisance costs, since that action will ordinarily require unacceptable levels of
prevention costs.").
113. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1277 ("Nothing in the Nollan or Doean majority opinions (or
the subsequent state court case law) indicates that a court may or should consider the
anticipated positive externalities of a development project in determining 'proportionality'
under the nexus/rough proportionality standard.").
114. In reality, it is possible that the conditions themselves might generate some small
surplus for the community if "rough proportionality" were stretched to its outer limit. A
community might also be induced to engage in a land use transaction by graft or other covert
transfers of surplus. The key insight, however, is that some surplus must be forhcoming from
some quarter to make land use transactions worthwhile for a community under a nexus and
proportionality bargaining regime.
115. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing overregulation).
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distinct situations in which the nexus and proportionality conditions will
actually be attractive to the community, both of which involve benefits to the
community stemming from the development project. I will address the first
of these, which occurs in connection with "good" or "legitimate" regulatory
action (as opposed to strategically manipulative government action), in this
section. I will discuss the second situation, which occurs in connection with
shamelessly strategic and acquisitive governmental action, in the next
section.
In the "good government" scenario, the community knows that the
development will generate a small benefit for the community, but that
benefit will be overshadowed by the harm caused by the development.' 6 To
return to our example, imagine that Ambrose's gas station, which would
cause $300,000 worth of harm to the community, would also generate
$200,000 in benefits for the community (through, say, an improved quality
of life). In this situation, the original zoning law banning the development is
rational from the community's perspective, though inefficient from a
societal standpoint given the gains Ambrose expects to realize from the
development. If the community is allowed to impose nexus and
proportionality conditions that will compensate it for the $300,000 worth of
harm, it will be delighted to approve the project so that it can receive the
$200,000 worth of benefits associated with the development. Even after the
community pays for the $20,000 study to prove nexus and proportionality, it
still ends up $180,000 ahead. In this situation, nexus and proportionality do
not foreclose an advantageous trade. If the nexus and proportionality
solution is relatively cheap, the parties will enjoy a large surplus as a result of
the bargain.
Generally, however, the nexus and proportionality solution will be
relatively expensive and will yield a much smaller surplus than would a
bargain involving conditions selected by the parties (or an outright cash sale
of zoning rights). The reason for this is simple: a community will typically
place a much lower value on complete remediation of a given externality
than it will cost the landowner to provide such complete remediation. 117 The
difference between the two valuations builds a "deadweight loss" into the
transaction. To return to our example, imagine that the nexus and
116. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1277 (discussing the situation in which development
generates "net negative externalities").
117. See supra note 112; see also Been, supra note 2, at 544 (noting that "the remedy for the
harm may be more costly than the value of preventing the harm").
118. The term "deadweight loss" denotes a loss of surplus that could otherwise be enjoyed
by one or both of the parties. It occurs when one party is forced to bear costs associated with a
particular expenditure or activity that exceed the gains to the other party from that expenditure
or activity. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326 (1993) ("[An
individual's self-interested, opportunistic act will create a deadweight loss whenever the costs it
inflicts on others exceed the individual's benefits from the act."); David A. Weisbach, Line
Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1650 (1999)
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proportionality remediation would, more realistically, be expensive. If it cost
Ambrose $800,000 or more, he would no longer be interested in the deal
and the transaction would not occur, even though the community would
have been satisfied with a mere $300,000 to compensate it for its harms. n 9 In
this situation, the deal-killing deadweight loss of $500,000 represents the
difference between the cost of the remediation and its value to the
community.
Let us assume instead that it would cost Ambrose $750,000, so that he
would still be interested in the transaction. However, the community would
not be benefited $750,000 by the remediation; instead, it would (at most) be
compensated the $300,000 worth of harm it would otherwise experience as a
result of the development. There would be an unavoidable deadweight loss
of $450,000. If the community would receive $180,000 in other benefits from
the gas station (after spending $20,000 to prove nexus and proportionality),
the deal would go through. However, the parties would enjoy only a
$230,000 surplus between them (Ambrose's $50,000 plus the community's
$180,000) as a result of the zoning change. In contrast, the earlier
community pool example generated at least a $400,000 surplus to be shared
between the parties. The hypothetical cash sale generated a $500,000
surplus. These numbers are invented, of course, but they are not
implausible. The conceptual problem has been cogently articulated by
Jerold Kayden:
Interestingly, a ban on unrelated amenities interferes not only with
the preferences of city mothers and fathers, but potentially with
those of property owners as well. Given the choice between the
'unrelated' beach easement and the 'related' viewing spot, for
example, the Nollans might very well have selected the beach
easement. In the typical incentive zoning transaction, the
developer's choice between related and unrelated amenities would
reduce to an economic calculus in which developers, in return for
a bonus, would prefer to provide an inexpensive unrelated amenity
rather than an expensive related one. 11
0
Richard Epstein has suggested that nexus is valuable in that it "narrow
the size of the bargaining range and hence reduces the state's ability to
extract concessions from individual owners."'2 ' The problem is that nexus,
(explaining that "deadweight loss of the tax is the loss in value to consumers in excess of the
revenue raised by the government").
119. See Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exadions, supra note 15. at 105 (presenting a
similar example).
120. Kayden, supra note 53, at 47-48; se COOTER, supra note 25, at M299301 (prodding
examples to demonstrate potential superiority of offsetting harms rather than mitigating them):
Dana, supra note 15, at 1277-82 (providing examples that demonstrate tie potential inefficiency
ofnexus and proportionality).
121. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 183-84.
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especially when combined with the additional requirement of
proportionality, narrows the bargaining range far too much. 22 If it simply
placed an upper bound on the price of waiving the regulations, the parties
would remain free to choose a more efficient alternative that did not
manifest an essential nexus. As it is, the connected and proportional
concession sets both the bargaining ceiling and the bargaining floor,
interfering with the preferences that the bargaining parties might have for
an unrelated concession that would generate a larger surplus. In many
instances the nexus and proportionality requirements will either block a
transaction entirely or make it needlessly inefficient.
The argument, of course, is that the greater good of protecting the
landowner from possible extortion justifies the inefficiency. 2 4 To return to
Figure 2, the concern is not just that the community will capture part or all
of area X, but that it will have moved its regulatory regime to point C in
anticipation of the bargain, thereby potentially capturing all or part of area
Z as well. Because the community does not gain any marginal benefits from
shifting the regulatory regime from point A to point C (and in fact incurs
costs), it would only make this move for the express purpose of gaining
bargaining leverage for a future land use transaction.ss The nexus and
122. Nexus on its own might be rather broadly construed. For example, a development ban
and a development condition might both serve a vague purpose such as "maintaining the
neighborhood atmosphere." There might well be multiple concessions that would satisfy the
essential nexus requirement, permitting at least a small bargaining range. However, Dolan's
added requirement of rough proportionality eliminates such flexibility. This additional
requirement refines and reinforces the essential nexus requirement by making it clear that
conditions must not only serve the same purpose as the development ban, but must
affirmatively remediate identifiable harms that lend themselves to careful quantification. The
result is virtual elimination of any bargaining range.
123. One might argue that a rough proportionality requirement on its own, without a
nexus requirement, would effectively provide such a cap. See FtSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS,
supra note 2, at 349 ("[I]f the Court is willing to supervise the terms of trade for regulations
with its new 'rough proportionality' rule, the old nexus doctrine is unnecessary even for that
task."). Yet it is difficult to imagine meaningful monitoring of proportionality in the absence of
nexus. Only when the asserted harm and the asserted cure are conceptually linked to each
other is it realistically possible to assess their proportionality. The nexus requirement keeps the
bargaining chips in a common metric so that they can be counted, while rough proportionality
requires that the chips be tallied up with at least rough accuracy.
124. For this to be the case, the bargaining limits would have to reduce "the resource losses
from destructive bargaining games." EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at
188. This reduction must be by an amount greater than the efficiency losses from blocked
bargains. See Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions, supra note 15, at 104-05 (illustrating
this principle with an example of costs related to reducing congestion).
125. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE LJ. 385, 428 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls] (describing a "typical
scenario" in which a "suburb deliberately imposes excessive development standards" but "in fact
has no interest in promoting the deadweight loss that would result if homeowners complied
with these wasteful standards" and is imposing the standards only to gain "maximum leverage in
the subsequent bargaining").
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proportionality limits are supposed to curb the illegitimate overregulation
that stems from such strategic impulses.126 But can they really do so? The
analysis that follows strongly suggests a negative answer.
2. Overregulation
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the nexus and proportionality
requirements do too much insofar as they block efficient bargains. Observed
from another angle, however, the nexus and proportionality limits do far too
little. Specifically, they cannot effectively protect landowners from
overregulation or significantly deter strategic government behavior. To see
why this is so, it is necessary to consider the second scenario in which a
community will be willing to engage in a land use bargain featuring a nexus
and proportionality condition.
In the "good government" example, the community was initially
regulating land use in a straightforward manner. The harms associated with
development ($300,000 in our example) outweighed the benefits to the
community ($200,000), and the community needed to impose a condition
of some sort in order to make the zoning change beneficial. It is possible to
imagine a "bad government" scenario as well, in which the proposed
development would generate $500,000 in benefits for the community while
imposing only $300,000 in harm.12 7 In that situation, a ban on development
is actually harmful for the community. The community would be better off
lifting the ban, even in the absence of any developer concessions." The
126. See Been, supra note 2, at 491 ("Requiring a local government to spend exactions on
projects that are germane to the harm the development causes limits the potential profit from
overregulation and thereby helps to ensure the efficient level of regulation.:); sme also EssTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 183-84 (suggesting that nexus provides a useful,
albeit "second-best," constraint on governmental abuses). Epstein's criticism of land use
bargains is that they potentially "bundle" a socially efficient shift (the transfer of land use rights
from the community to the landowmner) ith an inefficient shift (the transfer of an easement
from the landowner to the community, even though it is worth more to the landowner than to
the community). See generaly Epstein, Harms and Bernfils, supra note 57. His preferred solution
would be to "unbundle" these components of the bargain and require the government to pay
for any easement it acquires. Id. He does not, however, make the symmetrical suggestion that
landowners be required to pay for the land use rights they wish to acquire, presumably because
he believes the land use restrictions are illegitimate in the first place and would be lifted for
free if they could not be used to leverage acquisition of the easement. See Ers'rt.4, BMRQU.,u=
WITrH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 181,183.
127. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1277 (discussing "development generating no net negative
externalities").
128. By "better off," I do not mean merely financially better off, but truly better off in the
community's owm view-counting whatever tangibles and intangibles the community itself finds
relevant. Although I am using monetized costs and benefits for simplicity, I do not mean to
suggest that a community is acting strategically any time it takes a land use action that fails to
make it better offfinanciay. See supra note 84 (contemplating nonmonetary benefits). Rather, I
am talking here about truly strategic land use regulation, in which a community bans
development that it would actually prefer, for the sole purpose of extracting concessions from
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only reason that a community would impose such a ban would be to gain a
strategic advantage that would enable it to extract benefits from the
developer. Yet, even if land use bargains are constrained by nexus and
proportionality, the government is clearly better off overregulating. If it does
so, it can then impose a condition that will compensate it for the $300,000 in
harms. It will then reap the full $500,000 in benefits from the development
($480,000 after proving nexus and proportionality), rather than the mere
$200,000 it would net without the regulation. As the example indicates,
nexus and proportionality requirements do not necessarily eliminate the
community's incentive to overregulate.129
This may not seem very insidious in our example, which involves a fairly
intensive use of land (a gas station) and a fairly commonplace zoning
restriction. But the same reasoning explains why nexus and proportionality
will do little to curb even the most outlandish forms of overregulation
imposed by a venal governmental entity. To show how the various
bargaining problems might play out under less benign conditions, the next
set of examples involves a governmental entity dedicated solely to the goal of
redistributing goods and services from the politically powerless members of
the community to those with more political clout. This government is
shameless about inventing totally nonsensical rules purely for strategic
purposes.
Our imaginary government is led by a manipulative ruler, Simon.
Simon is allowed to make rules about what individuals may and may not do,
but he is forbidden to take away anyone's property outright. In order to do
anything Simon forbids (or to avoid doing anything that Simon says to do),
one must purchase the "violation rights" from Simon. Whenever Simon and
his cronies want some extra money or other goods, they simply make uip a
rule that is very costly for people to follow, such as requiring that people hop
on one foot whenever traveling on city sidewalks. Simon gets a little bit of
tyrannical pleasure out of watching a few pedestrians hop about, but too
many hopping pedestrians would definitely get on his nerves, His real
motive is not to induce hopping but to induce payments from people who
find it very costly to hop. If Simon's rules are completely unreviewable, fully
enforceable, and also fully alienable, Simon and his friends will be able to
acquire as much property as they like, free of charge.
130
the landowner.
129. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1277 (pointing out insufficiency of nexus and rough
proportionality standards where development will generate no net negative externalities).
Nexus and proportionality can reduce the size of the surplus that a community can extract as a
result of its overregulation. Likewise, the requirement that a community prove nexus and
proportionality can further shrink its expected surplus from a given land use deal. Nevertheless,
these requirements are unlikely to curb the overregulation itself.
130. If Simon's community is a democracy, the political process will automatically provide
some limits. However, the political process would not stop rules targeted at politically powerless
or unpopular groups, or rules that are automatically suspended at the request of the politically
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One might think that the problem would disappear entirely if Simon
were forbidden to sell violation rights to his rules. Indeed, if Simon finds a
lot of hopping citizens unpleasant to behold, making the violation rights
inalienable would be sufficient to deter him from passing the hopping rule
in the first place. But if we change the hypothetical a little, so that the rule in
question is one which benefits Simon (even a little), the analysis changes
entirely. Imagine Simon mildly enjoys blue houses and decides to pass a law
requiring all house exteriors to be painted blue. He would be happy if
people bought the rights to keep their house some other color (his
preference is only a mild one), but, other things being equal, he would
rather have the houses painted blue. Interestingly, making the violation
rights inalienable in this situation does not deter Simon from imposing his
"blue house law." After all, he gains a little bit from the rule. Assuming other
people have stronger preferences about the colors of their own homes, the
result is vastly inefficient.
Inalienable land use regulations would, therefore, appear to be a viable
solution only in situations where the governmental body is solely motivated
by strategic considerations. The reason for this becomes clear if one reviews
Figure 2. In the absence of any restrictions on land use regulations, the
community could be expected to keep adding restrictions until the marginal
benefits of doing so reached zero-f-ar past the point of efficient regulation.
Thus, foreclosing governmental bodies from using regulations as bargaining
chips does not prevent overregulation; indeed, it will not eliminate any
regulations that generate benefits (however minimal) for the community.
It does not require an overly sanguine view of government to anticipate
that most regulatory actions will generate at least some minimal benefits for
the community. Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that making
regulations less freely alienable does not trigger a massive roll-back of
regulatory measures. 13 The situation might be different, however, in some
cases involving undeveloped land, where development would generate large
benefits for the community (and overregulation would generate large
opportunity costs). This possibility is depicted in Figure 3.
powerful. For example, if few people ever walk anywhere in Simon's community (or.
alternatively, if dispensations are given aNay for free to the powerful elements of the
community), the hopping rule might not be subject to a political check.
131. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 346 (noting that the California
Coastal Commission did not relax its regulations in the seven years folio-ing the Ve!an
decision). Fischel points out that most regulations "are adopted for a reason, suggesting that
"making the regulations inalienable via the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not going to
make the regulations go away.' I& at 346-47.
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As in the previous figures, the horizontal axis in Figure 3 represents the
degree of restrictiveness of land use regulations. The community's utility
curve represents the community's total benefits resulting from the
restrictions. The curve indicates that regulations continue to generate
benefits for the community (though at a decreasing rate) up to point A,
which represents the community's preferred regulatory point. Beyond point
A, additional restrictions no longer generate added benefits, and, in fact,
entail opportunity costs. The landowner's utility curve reflects the intuition
that land use regulations increase utility up to a point by providing
reciprocal advantages for the landowner (by, for example, protecting her
from negative externalities associated with nuisances). The landomer's
benefits continue to increase to point L, her preferred regulatory regime,
and then drop off at an increasing rate. At some point, the regulations are
so restrictive as to deny the landowner all economically viable use of her
land. This point corresponds to point T (for "taking") in the figure.
We could expect a ban on land use bargaining to deter the regulatory
regime from moving to the right of A, but it would never move it to the left
of A. Takings law already prohibits movement to the right of point T, so
bargaining restrictions would yield results only for regulation falling in
between these points. Significantly, A does not represent an efficient level of
regulation. The efficient point of regulation occurs when the marginal
benefits associated with regulation match the marginal opportunity costs for
the landowner. In other words, the efficient point is the point at which the
community's utility curve is rising at exactly the same rate as the landowner's
utility curve is dropping. This will occur somewhere in the region between B
and B'.3 2 At point A, the total benefits to the community have leveled off, so
that the marginal benefits to the community are at zero; at the same time,
the landowner's total benefits are dropping precipitously.
One might think, however, that stopping the government at point A is
still better than nothing. How much can really be gained by drawing the line
at A depends on the extent to which, as an empirical matter, governmental
bodies are likely to enact regulations that would decrease overall utility for
the community to attain bargaining power, and whether the related costs
outweigh the inefficiencies of blocking land use bargains. If there is a
problematically large category of purely strategic governmental regulation,
however, nexus and proportionality will do little or nothing to address it.
Indeed, nexus and proportionality requirements (unlike an outright ban on
all bargains) may be unable to keep government regulation from moving to
the right of point A.
132. Because Figure 3 shows total benefits rather than marginal ones, it is difficult to
pinpoint the spot where the marginal benefits of the landowner and the community are
equivalent. Figure 2, which depicts marginal benefits, proides a dearer picture of the efficient
point.
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To sell violation rights under a nexus and proportionality bargaining
regime requires, as a threshold matter, identification of some legitimate
government interest which would be "substantially advanced" by a given
rule. 13 3 This need not detain an imaginative despot for long. Simon might,
for example, justify his hopping rule by asserting that hopping improves
cardiovascular health or makes pedestrians more visible to automobile
drivers and thereby reduces accidents. Exacting payments for the privilege
of not hopping makes sense, he might argue, since those who fail to hop
impose higher health care costs on the rest of society. Suppose further that
Simon met the nexus and proportionality requirement by decreeing that
violation rights payments be calibrated to equal the additional expected
public health burden, and earmarked for a health care fund.
3 4
If most or all citizens take the bargain (as we might expect, since
compliance with the hopping rule is very costly), then Simon is not
"punished" for his regulatory excesses by being forced to endure the sight of
a hopping populace. While it is true that he will not get to use the money as
he wishes, it is plausible that this nexus and proportionality exaction would
generate some benefits for Simon. For example, Simon can spend the budget
surplus generated by the health care savings on things that will benefit
himself and his friends.
Critical to this outcome is the fact that Dolan's proportionality
requirement does not incorporate an offset for the benefits generated for
the community by a given development. In other words, under Dolan, a
"proportional" solution need only be proportional to gross harms, not net
harms, generated by the development. 35 Dolan-like proportionality, applied
in the context of our example, would require only that the violation
proceeds be calibrated and applied to remediate costs associated with the
higher accident rate. The vast cost savings for the community also generated
by violation of the rule-avoidance of an annoying visual disturbance-
would not be included in the calculus. This explains why a legally
permissible nexus and proportionality exaction could be negotiated even
where the rule from which it relieves an individual landowner would, if
followed, be extremely costly for the rest of the community.
One might object that this example is just plain silly and that courts
133. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) (recognizing that no
taking occurs where a regulation "substantially advances" a legitimate state interest).
134. This assumes that there are, in fact, expected differences in health care costs. Such an
assumption is not completely implausible (even on these facts) and is in no way inconsistent
with the fact that the hopping rule is, on balance, one that generates costs for the community.
The costs associated with the visual disturbance caused by hopping may far outweigh the health
benefits associated with hopping, but this does not eliminate the possibility that the rule does
actually generate some health benefits.
135. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1277 (observing that the Nollan and Dolan decisions do not
contemplate consideration of positive benefits generated by a development in assessing
proportionality).
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would, in fact, strike down anything as ridiculous as Simon's hopping rule.
This observation only reinforces my point. To the extent that limits on the
underlying regulatory scheme can be enforced, problematic overregulation
can be curtailed. To the extent no such limits exist, using nexus and
proportionality to constrain subsequent bargains will do nothing to
construct such limits. If the hopping rule were deemed to be a valid exercise
of the state's regulatory power, a nexus and proportionality bargain to lift
the rule would be logically unassailable-and fully as problematic as my
example suggests.
The key insight is that the nexus and proportionality rule will not deter
overregulation-even to the right of point A in Figure 3-if the exaction in
question generates any benefits at all for the community. When people pay
an exaction to get out of a strategically-enacted regulation lying to the right
of point A, they are reducing costs for the community in two ways. First, they
are keeping the socially costly rule from harming the community by buying
their way out of it. Second, they are making payments to the community in
some form or other, which may be expected to generate at least minimal
benefits.
To take a somewhat less hypothetical example, imagine that banning all
development on a given tract is costly for the community, and that the
community would suffer gravely if it actually enforced this ban. Nevertheless,
it is likely that the development will generate some identifiable externalities,
such as increased traffic. The community would not be deterred from
overregulating in this situation (assuming that exit threats are not
credible),'3 since it would never actually be forced to bear the cost of
nondevelopment. Instead, the community would receive payments targeted
at remediating the added traffic and would thus be better off than if it had
never enacted the excessive regulation. It is difficult to imagine a
circumstance in which this principle would not hold.
Consider the facts of Nollan itself. Let us assume that a community is
trying to decide what sort of land use restrictions it will place on beachfront
properties. Further assume that it knows there is a demand for expansion or
rebuilding of beach cottages and that it will lose tax money if these cottages
are not expanded or rebuilt. What regulatory regime should it adopt. One
which freely allows cottages to be expanded and rebuilt, or one which
forbids this unless a bargain can be struck that exhibits nexus and
proportionality? If we assume that some of the community's voting citizens
would enjoy a "viewing spot" (a solution that the Nollan Court suggested
would pass constitutional muster), and if we further assume that there is no
136. A developer can make a credible "exit threat7 if he would be able to exit the
jurisdiction and develop elsewhere with relative ease. &e grnrally Been, supra note 2 (discussing
"exit"). To the extent exit threats are credible and place meaningful limits on regulation, such
limits would exist independent of the nexus and proportionality requirements. See infra notes
195-197 and accompanying text (discussing exit); infra Part II.B (same).
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way for the cottage owners to exit the jurisdiction, the community could be
expected to impose a ban on development and then extract the concession
in exchange for development rights. The community loses no tax money if
people go ahead with their building plans, and it gains a free "viewing spot"
in the process. If one deems such a ban on cottage expansion to constitute
improper "overregulation'-a point that is open to debate-it would not be
deterred by a nexus and proportionality rule.
Nexus and proportionality restrictions on bargaining do nothing to
limit the scope of land use regulation or to confine it to the "legitimate"
sphere (however defined). At best, they limit the amount of surplus that a
governmental entity can extract from strategic regulation. The tremendous
waste with which they accomplish even this modest task demands a search
for a better alternative.
3. Underregulation
Nexus and proportionality have a further claim to legitimacy that is far
more powerful, though often overlooked. I13 By keeping bargains focused on
the proportionate remediation of actual externalities, these requirements
would seem to preclude deals that would make the bargaining parties-the
controlling majority and the individual landowner-better off, while leaving
an unrepresented segment of the community exposed to unremediated
externalities. In other words, nexus and proportionality might be expected
to combat underregulaion-the phenomenon of selling violation rights too
cheaply, in currency unsatisfactory to, or never received by, those who are
impacted by the violation itself.
For example, imagine that Ambrose's gas station will impose fumes and
noise on only a small, powerless subset of the population-those who live,
say, within a block of the site. The majority interests within the community,
who are not negatively affected by the development, might prefer to strike a
bargain which would grant them valuable unrelated benefits (a community
swimming pool, for example), rather than a bargain that would simply
remediate the noise and fumes caused by the development. It is easy to see
that this sort of bargain might fail to protect the interests of the nearby
neighbors, who might not view the swimming pool as adequate
compensation for the harms they must endure. Because a nexus and
proportionality solution requires that the exaction relate directly and
proportionally to the harms caused by the development, it would seem to do
a better job of protecting the interests of those who are actually affected by
the development.
Nexus and similar concepts indeed appear to have opened the door to
137. See Been, supra note 2, at 506 (concluding that nexus is not designed to address
underregulation).
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third-party suits.Iss Third parties harmed by development might be able
attack "sweetheart deals" between developments and local governmental
bodies on the grounds that the concession lacks an essential nexus to the
harm caused by the development. And although the Court has used the
rough proportionality standard to prevent the government from requiring
too much remediation of the landowner, it is theoretically possible that third
parties might creatively wield the rule to attack bargains that involve too little
remediation of externalities. S
9
Yet, nexus and proportionality are blunt instruments for ensuring
governmental fairness and protecting against underregulation. The limits do
both too little and too much. They are markedly underinclusive rules,
protecting minority interests against underregulation only when it arises as
the result of a bargaining transaction. The rules provide no protection
against underregulatory regimes that occur through legislation or simple
government inaction.14 Even in the bargaining context, the government
may nevertheless disadvantage third parties by deciding what externalities
should count and what connections it will draw.14 The nexus and
proportionality rules are also troublingly overinclusive. A large category of
potentially efficient exchanges are simply blocked, without any evidence that
they would fil to appropriately compensate the affected parties.
II. SEPARATING HARD BARGAINS FROM "REAL STEALS"
Land use bargains, even "hard bargains," plainly have the potential to
yield Pareto-efficient outcomes. Blocking them through judicial limits on
land use bargains is counterproductive on the one hand, and insufficient on
the other. Neither overregulation nor underregulation provides a
compelling justification for nexus and proportionality. Yet the risk of
strategic and unfair governmental action remains and must be addressed in
138. See FIScHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 349-50 (discussing potential of
third-party intervention on NoUan grounds to interfere with deals bemeen developers and
regulatory bodies).
139. A bargain that requires the landowner to remediate only a small portion of the harm
she causes might suggest that some additional consideration is floing from the landow.%ner to
the decisionmakers in violation of the nexus requirement. Alternatively, it might suggest that
the landowner is part of a newly-powerful interest group that has inordinate influence on
decisionmaking. (If the powerful landowners controlled decisionmaking at the time the
underlying land use restrictions were being considered, they presumably would have blocked
the restrictions.)
140. Where legislative or regulatory outcomes are controlled by a majority, one might
expect minority interests to receive too little protection from externalities. Where these
outcomes are controlled by interest groups (powerful developers, for example), the potential
for underregulation could be even greater.
141. SeeNollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 85, 862 (1987) (Brennan.J., dissenting)
("[T]he Commission should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to
demonstrate a specfic connection between provisions for access and burdens on access
produced by new development.").
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some fashion. The challenge is to find a way of controlling these risks
without needlessly blocking efficient land use transactions. To develop such
an approach, we must find the boundary line between legitimate, mutually
beneficial bargains and illegitimate uncompensated takings-"real steals."
The first step is to examine in some depth the nature and workings of the
strategic behavior problems that underlie judicial limits on land use
bargains. This exploration begins with the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
A. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DoCTRINE
In Dolan, the Supreme Court invoked the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as ajustification for invalidating land use bargains that fail to meet
certain criteria. 42 Although the Court characterized the doctrine as "well-
settled,"14 3 the application of this notoriously disordered legal concept to
land use bargains was neither obvious nor uncontroversial.' In this section,
I will sketch the central intuitions underlying the doctrine and consider
whether and how the doctrine mightjustify limits on land use bargains.
In simplest terms, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine operates to
block some subset of possible bargains between an individual and the
government. The possibility for unconstitutional conditions arises whenever
an individual is in a position to trade some right or privilege that implicates
a constitutional protection for a discretionary government benefit (or for
relief from a discretionary government burden). 45 The doctrine is puzzling
and problematic because it operates to invalidate what might otherwise
appear to be consensual, mutually-beneficial exchanges. 146 Various
explanations for the doctrine have been offered, many of which are well-
142. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This case inaugurates an even more recent
judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine: the application of the
'unconstitutional conditions' label to a mutually beneficial transaction between a property
owner and a city."); Laitos, supra note 9, at 893-94 & n.6 (taking issue with the Dolan Court's
characterization of the doctrine as "well-settled"). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has
never been applied with consistency. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at
9 (noting that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine "roams about constitutional law like
Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others"); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1416 ("As
applied ... the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies.").
145. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1421-28.
146. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 189, 190 (1989) [hereinafter Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions] ("The initial
query with unconstitutional conditions is disarmingly simple. Why have the doctrine at all? In
the usual case, the state is in a position to offer or withhold some benefit to an individual;
likewise, that person may accept or reject the benefit at will."); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1417
("[Wihy invalidate conditions that burdened parties are free to accept or reject, and why
invalidate conditions on benefits that government is free to grant or withhold in the first
place?").
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reasoned and cogent, but none of which is fully convincing.147
Much analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has focused
on whether the government's bargain would leave the individual better or
worse off than she otherwise would be-in other words, whether it is a true
"offer," as opposed to a "threat."'" This presents the most confounding
aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: determining an
appropriate baseline from which to assess governmental "offers."149 The
problem becomes apparent when one considers the prototypical example of
a slave owner who beats his slave every day.' When the slave owner "offers"
to refrain from beating his slave on a certain day, in exchange for some
action, does that proposal constitute an offer or a threat? The answer
depends on what baseline one uses.151
Focusing on whether a deal has the potential to make an individual
better off may seem a logical way to attempt to "solve" the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, given the threshold puzzle that the doctrine presents:
the apparent blockage of mutually-beneficial bargains. The conceptual
problem disappears if one can show that a given bargain is not truly
beneficial to the individual, but is instead the product of an illegitimate
manipulation of a regulatory baseline. Such an analysis implies that
constitutional protections are designed to protect some baseline level of
individual well-being and to permit all bargains that represent upward
departures from those baseline levels for an individual-a rather dubious
147. Searches for a unifying theoretical explanation of the doctrine's workings have been
largely fruitless. See, eg., Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & ,LARK V. TUSHNET, R IM.N TS OF BELIEF:
CONMIPORARYCONSrIuTIoNAL IssuEs 84 (1996) ("Because the problem is complex, it is little
wonder that no one has satisfactorily resolved it. It is too bad, however, that so many people
purport to have done so."). Some scholars have suggested that the search, and perhaps the
doctrine as well, should be abandoned altogether. &'e generaly Frederick Schauer, "/'co Hard:
Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistnny, 72 DEx'v. U. L REV. 989
(1995) (arguing that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine presents problems so difficult
that a solution is unlikely to be found); Cass R. Sunstein, igi
, 
the Unconstitutional Conmhtions
Doctrine is an Anachronism with Particular Referene to Rlgion, SprdI and Alortton, 70 B.U. L REV.
593 (1990) (arguing that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be abandoned).
148. SeeSeth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: 77heProbiem of Negatite Rights in a Poaslwe State,
132 U. PA. L REV. 1293, 1300-01, 1352-59 (1984) (arguing that it is necessary to distinguish
governmental "offers" from "threats"); Kenneth AV. Simons, Offers. 7hrats, ant U'nconstitutinal
Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289,308-11 (1989) (discussing significance of the threat/offer
distinction); see alsoALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202-21 (1987) (analyzing coercive proposals
by focusing on offers, threats, and baselines).
149. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 25.38; SEID.M" &
TUSHNET, supra note 147, at 72-90; Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1351-78; Sunstein, supra note
147, at 602-04.
150. This much-discussed example is Robert Nozick's. SeeSimos, supra note 148, at 312 &
n.74 (citing Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY; SCIENCE, AND MErHOD 4.10, 450 (5.
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969)).
151. See Nozick, supra note 150, at 450-51 (preferring a normative baseline); Simons, supra
note 148, at 312-13 (discussing the determination of threats and offers).
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proposition. One reason for skepticism relates to the "public goods" aspects
of constitutional rights. 15 A focus on individual well-being ignores the
society-wide benefits generated by constitutional protections.
It is more accurate and fruitful to think of the Constitution as placing
structural constraints on the kinds of decisions officials and entities are
permitted to make about individuals' lives, and to view the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as an extension of these structural constraints.
15 3
Applied to the bargaining setting, these structural constraints limit the sorts
of things that a particular governmental entity can legitimately give and
receive in trade. Significantly, individuals do not bargain with a monolithic
"state" but rather with an individual governmental entity or actor which
possesses a particular constitutional and political status. In the land use
context, the entity in question, the zoning board, is (at least theoretically)
controlled by a political majority. 154 It thus becomes critical to understand
the kinds of benefits that a majoritarian entity is empowered to dispense, as
well as the kinds of goods that such an entity can legitimately receive in
trade. 155 This analysis suggests that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is violated when the governmental entity receives something in trade that it
152. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859 (1995) (suggesting that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
can be understood as a response to the public goods aspects of constitutional rights).
153. "Structural" concerns have often been noted in the unconstitutional conditions
context. See, for example, Been, supra note 2, at 497-98 & n.125 (discussing the "structural"
version of the inalienability argument); Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1387-90 (discussing
structural justifications for making certain rights non-waivable).
154. Public choice theory casts doubt on the ability of political entities to register the
preferences of majorities accurately. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (discussing public choice and its
implications); Dana, supra note 15, at 1269-74 and sources cited therein (discussing political
forces at work in development decisions). Nevertheless, local communities may be among the
most "majoritarian" institutions known to government, presenting all of the risks that
"majoritarianism" entails. See Fischel, Introduction, supra note 15, at 1582 ("Local governments
are more prone to majoritarianism than other levels of government because they usually lack
the electoral diversity that comes with large land area and large population and because, as
derivative governments, they also lack the other constitutional checks on the will of the
majority, such as bicameral legislatures and separation of powers."); see also FISCHEL,
REGULATORYTAKINGS, supra note 2, at 137 (observing that legislation by the national legislature
should be given higher judicial deference). I will assume for the present discussion that a
political majority controls land use decisions, while recognizing that this is something of an
oversimplification.
155. In other contexts, notably criminal procedure, "the state" with whom one is
bargaining is not a majoritarian entity, but rather a police officer or a prosecutor. It is possible
that the lower degree of protection generally attending waivers of constitutional rights in tle
area of criminal procedure can be explained by the fact that majoritarian influences are
generally more attenuated in that context. However, majoritarian risks are undeniably present
in certain Fourth Amendment contexts, as where suspicionless searches are made prerequisites
for benefits such as welfare, public housing, extracurricular public school activities, and public
employment.
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is constitutionally precluded from accepting, or when it gives something in
trade which it has no power to give.15
6
Considered in this light, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
encompasses three distinct types of wrongful governmental action: (1)
receiving forbidden goods; (2) bargaining with currency illegitimately
appropriated from the other party;, and (3) bargaining with currency
illegitimately appropriated from segments of the community that are not
represented at the bargaining table. Each of these problems could be
addressed through constitutional tools and doctrines existing independent
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine1S7 However, the doctrine is
worth preserving as a shorthand designation for the manifestations of these
constitutional problems as they arise in the bargaining conteX.'A doctrine
which focuses attention on bargains qua bargains serves the practical
function of promoting vigilance against government malfeasance in a setting
where it is especially likely to be implicated. It is important to note that the
bargaining context merely offers a focal point for detecting otherwise illicit
governmental conduct. Just as law enforcement personnel might watch for
marked bills in an effort to catch a bank robber, monitoring governmental
bargains may help to unmask instances of illegitimate conduct.
As this analogy suggests, the standards for determining whether the
government has acted wrongfully must come from the substantive
constitutional doctrines; the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot
itself supply these standards. Instead, it merely provides a lens for
monitoring the things that the government is attempting to receive and give.
Identifying the constitutional rights and prerogatives over which a
governmental entity may receive control and determining when
governmental actions constitute "illegitimate appropriation," are context-
specific tasks that throw the difficult analytic work back on the underl)ing
substantive constitutional doctrines. These substantive doctrines may also
implicate context-specific baseline problems, as the takings doctrine does in
the land use context. Whether something is a "taking" depends critically on
what property entitlement baseline one uses. Attempts to establish that
baseline depend on other slippery standards, such as what constitutes a
"nuisance" or an "externality." These problems are difficult ones, but they
are not unique to the bargaining context.
I will consider each of these three bargaining risks in turn, with special
attention to whether and how each might apply in the land use context.
156. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 4-5 (discussing problems
with governmental "givings"); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1489 (focusing on problem of the
government receiing relinquishment of certain rights).
157. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 620-21 (suggesting unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be abandoned in favor ofcontext-specific inquiries into incursions on rights).
158. See id. at 605-06 (discussing a similar argument for presening tie unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
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1. Receiving Forbidden Goods
The first constitutional problem in the bargaining context occurs when
a governmental entity receives something that it is constitutionally disabled
from receiving. Under the Constitution, there are a set of individual
decisions which cannot be made by a majority vote. 1" For example, a
majority, no matter how large and well-meaning, cannot hold a binding vote
to choose my religion, censor my speech, or confiscate my property without
paying just compensation. It follows that a majoritarian entity is
constitutionally disabled from receiving waivers of these kinds of rights or
from gaining power over certain individual decisions that implicate
constitutional protections. This remains true even though the majority can
make binding, fully discretionary decisions about whether to give out or
withhold all sorts of benefits. 6° Thus, one aspect of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine responds to the possibility that a majority-controlled
entity might use its power over the discretionary dispensation of benefits to
leverage the surrender of a right it is disabled from controlling directly.
An analogy to an impermissible private deal may help to clarify. If
Bernice is legally prohibited from owning a certain thing, such as a gun
(perhaps she is a convicted felon), she cannot engage in a bargain in which
she receives the gun in exchange for something of her own, such as her
stamp collection. Significantly, the bargain is illegitimate even though
Bernice's authority over the fate of her stamp collection is absolute and
unquestioned.
This example illustrates the problem with the discredited "greater
includes the lesser" argument, which maintains that the government's ability
to withhold a benefit completely necessarily allows the granting of that
benefit on any conditions whatsoever. 161 Just as certain individuals are
forbidden to own certain kinds of chattels, certain governmental entities,
159. See Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964) ("A citizen's
constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose
that it be."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("IT~he very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials.").
160. As the web of government benefits grows ever larger, and as people become
increasingly dependent on those benefits, the line between withholding benefits and imposing
burdens blurs. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 601-04 (arguing that the distinction between
subsidies and penalties is anachronistic in the post-Lochner era). See generally Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing growth of various forms of government
largess and its implications for individual rights).
161. The classic statement of the "greater includes the lesser" argument was made byJustice
Holmes: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but lie has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892). This view has been repeatedly and explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, see,
e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996), although its spirit lingers on
in some settings. See Been, supra note 2, at 474 n.7 (citing cases from the last 125 years which
illustrate the "greater includes the lesser argument").
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such as political majorities, are forbidden to take control over certain
constitutional prerogatives. The fact that the government retains power to
dispense benefits at its discretion in no way weakens that structural
constraint. Such an exchange should be invalidated by the same reasoning
that invalidates Bernice's stamp-collection-for-gun exchange.
A similar intuition is expressed by theorists who view certain
constitutional rights as "inalienable. "162 Inalienability theories hold that
individual rightholders should be precluded from selling or trading away
their rights1ta Such theories often founder on the problem of individual
autonomy and the apparent paternalism associated with preventing an
individual from engaging in a sale or trade which she desires.
However, as Kathleen Sullivan notes, the real question underlying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not one of alienability generally, but
whether the right in question "may be relinquished to govenzment."t'10 The
governmental entity's structural inability to receive control of the particular
right provides a compelling constitutional justification for invalidating such
bargains.1t a  This structural constraint interferes with one aspect of
alienability (specifically, the rightholder's ability to transfer the right in
question to the government), but it is not founded on a theorist's view of what
people should be entitled to buy and sell. Rather, it is based on a
constitutional view of what majorities should be permitted to control. It is
only incidentally a constraint on the ability to sell a right; the real concern is
with preventing the government from "buying up" the rightL" This
structural constitutional constraint safeguards critical societal interests that
might otherwise be compromised.
162. See Been, supra note 2, at 496-97 (discussing inalienability theory of unconstitutional
conditions); see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Madrlt-lnalimnabiih;, 100 ,%Rv. L RL,: 1849
(1987) (discussing the form of inalienability that forbids sale of rights).
163. See Sullian, supra note 20, at 1479-80 (discussing inalienability theories).
164. See EPSTEIN, B.ARGAINING NTrtH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 14-15 (discussing shortfalls
of dignitary theories for restricting choice); Been, supra note 2, at 497 n.120 (noting that the
inalienability theory is internally contradictory); Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1383-84 (discussing
argument that making rights iv-able enhances autonomy); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1478,
1486-87 (discussing objections to inalienability theories); see also Radin, supra note 162. at 1898-
1903 (discussing and rejecting such objections to inalienability).
165. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1488-89.
166. See Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1391 (explaining that the government may be
"prohibited from attempting to affect exercise of the right in question because of effects on te
structure ofsociety").
167. SeeWyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309,328 (1971) (DouglasJ., dissenting) ("IT]he central
question is whether the government by force of its largesse has te power to 'buy up' rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.").
168. See generally Epstein, Unrmastitutional Conditions, supra note 116, at 197 (positing that
while an indiidual might consent to waive First Amendment rights to gain access to a key
benefit, such as use of the highways, "all people prefer to have a social order in which speech is
not compromised, but protected"); Merrill, supra note 152 (discussing "public goods7 aspects of
constitutional rights).
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The first inquiry under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, then,
is whether the governmental entity is permitted to receive a waiver of a given
constitutional right or to accept control over a particular decision that
implicates a constitutional right.169 Because this inquiry looks to the
substance of constitutional protections, different constitutional rights are
treated differently. Rights such as the freedom to exercise one's chosen
religion occupy one end of the spectrum and generally cannot be made the
subject of bargains with the government.' 70 Other constitutional rights are
routinely ceded to the government. For example, an individual can waive
Fourth Amendment protections by consenting to a search. 17 1 Bargains
involving the waiver of this right are considered permissible as long as they
are made under circumstances that do not vitiate consent.
72
In the land use context, the takings clause contains the operative
constitutional constraints. 173 We do not normally think of the takings clause
as waivable in any ordinary sense, yet it protects property rights that are
usually alienable at will. Some analytic work is necessary to determine
whether the takings clause potentially raises a "forbidden goods" problem.
Our starting point is simple: the takings clause is plainly designed to act as a
countermajoritarian check. 174 To take the easiest case, a majority cannot
169. See Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1387-89 (discussing waivable and non-waivable rights);
id. at 1391-93 (discussing problems associated with certain governmental requests for waivers).
170. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (stating that the government cannot
force an individual to "choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand").
171. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) ("[A] search conducted
pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.").
172. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 309 (holding that conditioning AFDC benefits on home visits
does not violate Fourth Amendment). Other procedural protections can also be waived under
appropriate circumstances. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970) (involving
waiver of right to trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (involving waiver of privilege
against self-incrimination). Under my model, the validity ofsuch waivers would depend on what
the government actor is offering in exchange. In the search and seizure context, for example, if
a police officer "offers" something back that she had no right to take away in the first place
(such as the right to continue going on one's way), or something that is misappropriated from
the public at large (such as a promise to give the person a chance to escape if incriminating
evidence is found), the resulting bargain should be considered constitutionally invalid.
173. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."). Other constitutional protections, such as the First Amendment,
are also implicated in some land use bargains. In addition, equal protection and substantive
due process may have a role to play in addressing unfair land use bargains. See Viii. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 562 (2000) (per curiam) (recognizing that an equal
protection claim could be brought by a single homeowner, where a municipality conditioned
connection of water service on what was alleged to be an "irrational and wholly arbitrary"
easement demand); infra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing substantive due process).
174. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and DistribuiveJustie, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 764 (1999)
(discussing Michelman's link *between landowner demoralization and majoritarian
exploitation); Saul Levmore,Just Compensation andJust Politics, 22 CONN. L. RhV. 285, 309 (1990)
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simply decide that an individual landowner has "too much" land and vote to
confiscate it-unless the taking is for public use and the majority pays just
compensation!"" The takings clause therefore can be viewed as preserving a
realm in which the market can function, free of majoritarian meddiing."'- As
much as a majority may wish to obtain land by using votes, the Constitution
tells the majority that it must use dollars or some other acceptable form of
"ust compensation."' Nevertheless, the majority may regulate land use as
long as the regulation does not go "too far" and deprive the landomer of all
"economically viable use" of the property."8' In Village of Eudid, the Court
assumed as much in discussing the political autonomy of the Village of
Euclid: "[Euclid's] governing authorities, presumably representing a
majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will, have determined, not that
industrial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of
such development shall proceed within definitely fixed lines.
"In
Thus, the takings clause can be thought of as drawing a wavering, semi-
permeable line between the majority-controlled realm, and a market-
controlled realm.'s0 One might think that the unconstitutional conditions
("A central theme of takings law is that protection is offered against the possibility that
majorities may mistreat minorities."); see also EPSTEIN, BARGAJNING TrH THE STATE, supra note
20, at 194-95 (noting problems with majority decisionmaking in land use context); Louise A.
Halper, Parables of Exdhnge: Foundations of Public Choice Throiy and the Atarhe Formalism ofJars
Buchanan, 2 CORNELLJ.L & PUB. POL'Y 229, 231 (1993) ("The paradigmatic majoritarian
decision is to redistribute wealth: the non-wealthy majority confiscates the wealth of the wealthy
minority.").
175. See generally Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding use of
eminent domain power to break up oligopoly of land ownership).
176. Just as there are certain realms in which money should have little or no influence, see
generally MICHAEL NVALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE (1983), the takings clause defines a realm in
which votes (unaccompanied by money or other compensation) cannot hold smay.
177. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 195-215 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAXINGS]
(discussing "implicit in-kind compensation").
178. See supra note 80 (discussing these standards).
179. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,389 (1926). Later in the opinion, the
Court approvingly quotes a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion deferring to political judgments
on land use matters. See id. at 393 ("'If [municipal land use ordinances] are not satisfying to a
majority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot-not the courts.") (quoting State v. New
Orleans, 97 So. 440,444 (La. 1923)).
180. The line is semi-permeable in two senses. First, the majority can always effect a transfer
of land to itself by payingjust compensation. Though money may change hands, the transaction
nevertheless represents a legitimate incursion of the majority into an area normally controlled
by market forces. The money with which just compensation is paid will be raised through some
form of political action, such as the le)ing of a tax, making it questionable whether the true
cost is internalized by the governmental entity. See Daryl J. Levinson, MAlaing Gaovnrmant Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CI. L REv. 345 paisir (2000)
(arguing that government does not internalize costs in the same manner as private firms).
Moreover, the amount of compensation will not necessarily equal the price that the landowner
would demand in a private transaction. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 177, at 183 (noting
that the "real but subjective" value placed on land is left out of the market valuation formula).
The line between majority-controlled and vote-controlled realms may also be permeated from
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doctrine would prevent the majority from using its power over things on one
side of that line (such as zoning) to leverage things on the other side of the
line (such as concessions of land). However, land and other typical
concessions (such as the payment of cash impact fees) are not only freely
alienable goods, but goods the government can and does routinely receive
from individuals. The takings clause does not prohibit property from being
"given" to anyone, including the government, nor does it prohibit the
government from receiving property in trade. Indeed, the clause
contemplates that the government will receive land for public use when just
compensation is paid, demonstrating that the majority is not disabled from
receiving land in the context of certain kinds of "fair" trades.'8' Thus, there
is nothing unconstitutional, in general, about the government receiving
land or other land use concessions in trade.
8 2
Moreover, the alienability of land is one of the things that gives it value;
it constitutes one of the "sticks" in the landowner's "bundle" of property
rights. 133 As Vicki Been points out, "[t]o argue that individuals cannot trade
their property to the government at whatever price they choose is
inconsistent with the deeply ingrained notion of property as including an
almost absolute right of alienation." Is4 Thus, the bargaining limits designed
to protect a landowner from an extortionate taking could themselves be
viewed as takings of a sort. The point is not merely academic. Although
majorities cannot constitutionally use votes to obtain property, landowners
may nevertheless wish to use their property to influence the decisions of the
majority, effectively translating their property into votes or political
outcomes.]s5 Because it is just as likely that any given land concession is the
result of landowner opportunism rather than majoritarian overreaching,
banning or severely constricting such bargains is problematic. Adopting a
rule that effectively limits the ways in which property can be used is a poor
way to protect property rights.
the other side. Unless land use bargains are banned, a landowner may try to use her money or
property to influence decisions of the majority concerning land use.
181. See Been, supra note 2, at 497 (noting that the Fifth Amendment permits the
government to obtain property by paying just compensation for it, and observing that
landowners have broad latitude to agree to whatever price they deem acceptable and can ever)
give away their land to the government).
182. The government might, however, be disabled from receiving land use concessions that
implicate other constitutional protections, such as the right to free expression. See BERNARD H.
SIEGAN, PROPERTYAND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGUIATION
162-64 (1997) (suggesting that free-speech questions were implicated by the "fee in lieu of art"
exaction upheld in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)).
183. See Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (1989) (discussing
the "bundle of sticks" metaphor of property).
184. Been, supra note 2, at 497.
185. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 194-95 (suggesting a
market mechanism is superior to the political process in determining the course of land
development).
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This does not mean that judicial oversight in the land use bargaining
arena is completely unnecessary or inappropriate. The discussion above
rules out one sort of unconstitutional conditions problem, but two
additional problems remain. Both problems are variants of the concern that
a majoritarian entity might, in preparation for bargaining, overstep
appropriate boundaries and obtain control over benefits which it has no
right to dispense.
2. Bargaining with the Opponent's Chips
One well-recognized threat associated with the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is that the state may manipulate the regulatory
background to take advantage of the individual. 16 Here, the problem is not
that the government will be receiving something that it has no right to
receive, but rather that the government will be offering something that
already belongs, by all rights, to the other bargaining party. This problem
can be illustrated by another private-action hypothetical. Imagine Bernice
wants a very rare stamp that is currently in the possession of another
collector, Cecil. Bernice, a professional thief, is having an unaccustomed
amount of trouble stealing the stamp because Cecil keeps it sealed in a
nested series of locked boxes inside a vault guarded by a pack of attack dogs.
Bernice decides to kidnap Cecil's (less well-guarded) baby daughter instead.
Bernice then offers Cecil the return of his daughter in exchange for the rare
stamp.
This bargain is illegitimate not because Bernice is disabled from
receiving the rare stamp, but because she stole the "currency" with which
she seeks to buy it. This is the same problem presented by the gunman's
threat, "your money or your life!"!87 There, the gunman's act of seizing
control over your life in order to use it as a bargaining chip in the ensuing
"bargaining session" is an impermissible act that renders any resulting
exchange illegitimate. 1
In both of these hypothetical cases, the "theft" in question is apparent
and undisputed. In land use, government overreaching is presumed to be
commonplace, but it is difficult to pinpoint. The line between forbidden
and permitted regulation is quite fuzzy, and the Court has done little to
clarify it. Nevertheless, the risk that the government may be bargaining with
stolen chips hovers in the background in Nollan, briefly taking shape in
186. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text (discussing setting of regulatory
baseline from which to assess governmental offers).
187. Discussions of this threat are ubiquitous in the literature. Sre Kreimer, supra note 148,
at 1354 & n.223 (describing the gunman threat example as "tattered by decades of use" but
"still illuminating").
188. See LEO K, /, ILL-GOTrEN GAINs: EvAsIoN, BLACI.MAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED Pr/'./US
OFTHE LAW 138-39 (1996) (analyzing various forms of coercion, induding the gunman's threat,
as offers to sell back what was wrongfully taken).
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Justice Scalia's reference to extortion. Commentators have raised similar
concerns. 189 Indeed, as Fischel has noted, the outrage associated with the
development condition in Nollan would disappear entirely if the land use
regulation in question were one that people generally would regard as
reasonable. 190 If, for example, the Nollans proposed building a drive-in
movie theater that would actually block a massive expanse of beachfront,
placing some beach access conditions on the development would seem
appropriate (perhaps even inadequate) to compensate for the lost view.
One might argue that any regulation disproportionate to harm is
fundamentally illegitimate and that it therefore constitutes an impermissible
bargaining chip. Dolan's requirement that exactions be roughly
proportionate to the harms caused by the development in question seems to
edge toward that conclusion. However, the Court has been unwilling to
apply Dolan's proportionality rule outside the context of exactions. 19 This
reluctance is understandable; a requirement of regulatory proportionality
would unravel the land use planning and zoning laws of thousands of local
governments. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions place land use regulations
that are unrelated to specific harms in an odd sort of limbo: they need not
be lifted at all, but if they are to be lifted, they must be lifted for free.
Whether a land use restriction like the one in Nollan actually constitutes
an illegitimate appropriation of bargaining power from the other party (as
opposed to a garden-variety legitimate government regulation) is open to
question. The answer will depend on normative judgments about where the
line ought to be drawn between majority power and market power. I do not
assert, as a normative matter, that regulations which fail to relate to precise
harms are unconstitutional, or that the application of the regulations to the
development proposals involved in Nollan and Dolan constituted theft-like
appropriations. Indeed, my own view is to the contrary. My point is that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine only extends to certain types of
bargaining problems, one of which involves the improper pre-bargaining
appropriation of things belonging to the other bargaining party. To the
extent this concern is encapsulated in the bargaining limits formulated in
Nollan and Dolan, the inquiry must turn to whether those limits can stop
189. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 702 ("A more common, and legal,
technique is to restrict most of the undeveloped land within the municipality, and then require
developers to buy the development rights through some form of public contribution.");
Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take'My Beach, Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Develoament Exactions, 69 B.U. L. RIV. 823, 859
(1989) ("Municipalities can attempt to base their exactions schemes on development
prohibitions that are excessive-i.e., prohibitions that are not constitutional exercises of the
police power-and then proceed to sell development 'permission' back to the developer.").
190. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 345 (using example of a "large
hotel, which truly would have blocked the view and stood out like the proverbial sore thumb").
191. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); supra notes 38-39
and accompanying text.
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illegitimate overregulation. 92
It is often assumed that limiting land use bargains involving stolen chips
will help to prevent the initial theft 93 However, this effort is unlikely to be
successful as long as the underlying regulatory action (the "theft") is
immune from challenge. If I steal my neighbor's car because I would like to
travel to California, the theft itself should be addressed. My neighbor's
interests will not be adequately protected by a rule stipulating that I may
only "trade" the car back for a plane, train, or bus ticket designed to achieve
my original objective. 94 Such a "nexus and proportionality" solution,
operating alone, fails to address the truly important question: whether my
objective of getting to California is one which my neighbor should have to
bankroll. If there is no meaningful way to check the underlying regulatory
rules, nexus and proportionality cannot provide a meaningful backstop.
Moreover, nexus and proportionality are completely unnecessary if the
underlying regulatory action is subject to meaningful scrutiny. In other
words, if no bargaining chips can be stolen, the potential for unfair bargains
based upon such sleight of hand is eliminated.
Thinking about the bargaining risks in this manner highlights a
problem with using "exit" as an answer to coercive land use exactions. 19' In
the land use context, the local entities that impose regulations typically have
a monopoly on land use regulation only within a limited geographic area. If
municipalities compete with each other for residents and for development,
and if individuals and businesses can select from a smorgasbord of
competing regulatory regimes, this might appear to place a limit on
governmental overreaching in the exactions context. This model has a
great deal of power. Exit unquestionably offers an important check on
192. The phrase "illegitimate overregulation" is not redundant. Regulation in excess of the
socially optimal point is not necessarily illegitimate as a constitutional matter. Of course it is
possible to advocate a constitutional standard that tracks the social optimum, effectively
collapsing the inquiries. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, spra note 20, at 90.103. If
such a standard were enforced, land use bargains would be wholly unnecessary.
193. Id. at 183-84; Been, supra note 2, at 491; see Morosoff, supra note 189, at 861 ('[W]hile
the rational-nexus test is admittedly not aimed directly at the true evil uith which the courts are
concerned, in the end it does eradicate that evil.").
194. See FiSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 11 (Takings law is about the
fairness of initial entitlements. Supervising their exchange, as the exactions cases do, does little
to cure the burden of the original regulation.").
195. Vicki Been's insightful work on "exit" in the exactions context, sre gmneraly Been, suplra
note 2, provides an excellent exploration of this topic. Been builds on Albert 0. Hirschman's
work discussing the response mechanisms of"exit" and 'voice." Se iUL at 476 (citing ALDIERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)). See also infra Part ILB (discussing exit as a
response to monopoly power). For criticisms of Been's analysis and conclusions, see EPSTEIx,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 184-87; Stewart E. Sterk, Conpdwlion Ar.ang
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L REV. 831 (1992).
196. See Been, supra note 2, at 506-28 (building on Charles Tiebout's theory of local
government competition).
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certain kinds of bargaining power, despite some criticisms that have been
raised.197
Exit cannot, however, adequately resolve the bargaining problem
presently under discussion. It fails because a premise of initial theft drives
the unconstitutional conditions analysis. If the government essentially steals
my right to build a house on my land and then offers to sell that right back
to me, my ability to exit by going to anotherjurisdiction does not change the
fact that the government's theft has left me worse off than before.
Something valuable has been stripped from my land, and I will not be able
to sell it for as much as it was worth before that theft. Even if my land is
identical to the land in the next county, and even if I have no particular
sentimental attachment to my land and no particularly heavy costs associated
with relocating, exiting will still leave me "out" the amount of the original
theft. My ability to exit may limit the price the government may charge to
sell me back my development rights, but it does not make me whole and is
unlikely to deter the initial theft.
3. Appropriations from Third Parties
I have focused thus far on the risk that strategic governmental behavior
might unfairly or unconstitutionally disadvantage the individual landowner
involved in the bargaining process. Another concern is that deals might be
made which advantage both the individual landowner and the majority, but
which unfairly burden a group within the community.198 In this case, the
government improperly gives away something it has taken from a third
party. For example, if Daphne offers Ethel fifty dollars for permission to
shoot firearms in Ethel's backyard (and further promises to aim away from
her house), both parties may be quite contented with the deal. Fiona, whose
backyard is adjacent to Ethel's, may be less pleased. The problem with the
bargain is that Ethel is acting without legal authority and to the detriment of
her neighbor's peace and safety in selling permission to discharge firearms
197. Specifically, "exit" offers a powerful antidote to the sort of undue market power which
is deemed problematic whether held by private or public actors. See infra Part lI.B (discussing
exit).
198. I use the term "majority" here as shorthand for the dominant group within the
political process, while acknowledging this may not always be an accurate designation. See supra
note 154. The same (or heightened) risks exist when those in charge of the political apparatus
do not represent the interests of a political majority. Graft presents a polar case: the bribed
official and the landowner are made better off at the expense of the rest of the community. It is
also possible that the political process takes into account all of the interests existing within the
geographic boundaries of the political subdivision, but disadvantages an affected group that
does not (or does not yet) reside within those boundaries. See Clayton P. Gillette, ExIropriation
and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. R'v. 625, 629 (1994)
(discussing "risk that local decisions will be made in a way that does not internalize adverse
consequences").
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in her backyard.1'
The analysis is similar in the land use context. For example, imagine
that Gilroy wishes to operate a tannery on a parcel of land. Current zoning
restrictions prohibit this use of the land because it will produce noxious
waste. Gilroy and his community strike a deal in which the land use
restriction is lifted. However, the condition placed on Gilroy does not
involve remediating the waste; rather, the waste will be dumped into a
nearby stream which empties into the land of a lone, friendless farmer.
Gilroy purchases permission to engage in this pollution by agreeing to
donate part of his land for a small county airport. The zoning board is aware
that the waste will doubtless sicken the farmer's pigs, but nobody in the
community really likes the farmer anyway. On the other hand, the rest of the
community has been clamoring for a convenient airport which would
otherwise have to be paid for through taxation.
The bargain is win-win from the standpoint of Gilroy and the dominant
political elements of the community (assuming the airport is cheaper than
the control and remediation of the noxious waste). However, it imposes
serious externalities on the farmer. The problem with this deal is that
permission to dump waste into the stream did not properly belong to the
zoning board. Because the zoning board is bound by law to make
appropriate use of land use regulations to protect the community from
negative externalities, the grant of permission can be viewed as an ultra vires
action. 20 Significantly, opportunities for exit do little or nothing to control
this problem. Gilroy will not want to exit; he is getting a very good deal and
has no incentive to look elsewhere. The farmer might leave if conditions
became intolerable, but this is unlikely to provide a realistic check on
government action unless the farmer generates significant tax revenues for
the community.
Though not denoted as such, a concern with such third-party impacts
appeared in the Court's analysis in Nollan. This concern vms most fully
presented in a footnote to the opinion:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of
the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use
regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more
199. Epstein makes a similar point when he observes that every governmental "giving' of
benefits involves an antecedent "taking," which may or may not be legitimate. Er, sU.I,
BARGAINING vTH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 4.
200. Such action may be ultra vires in a quite literal, as well as metaphorical, sense. Local
governments regulate land pursuant to state enabling legislation, and actions like the one
described here might well violate the terms of that enabling legislation. Sre genial/y Frona M.
Powell, Challenging Authorityfor Munidpal Subdivision Exarlions: 77e Ultra rens A ttack, 39 D.PAUL
L REv. 635 (1990) (discussing ultra vires challenges to municipal subdivision exactions).
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lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the
importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only
does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for
eliminating the prohibition, but positively militates against the
practice.
20
1
The concern is not that consent to a given land use change will be sold
for an extortionately high price, but that it will (at least with respect to some
subset of the population) be sold too cheaply. The feared result is not
overregulation, but underregulation. 2  Justice Scalia's hypothetical
involving the sale of the right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater makes a
similar point. 203 The sale of the right to violate a valid and important public
safety regulation involves illegitimate governmental action which endangers
third parties who were apparently not represented at the bargaining table
(theatergoers who will be trampled as a result of the ensuing panic).
Interestingly, it is this third constitutional problem, and only this third
problem, that might actually justify judicial review of the substance of land
use bargains. The first unconstitutional conditions problem is simply
inapplicable to the land use context, and the second disappears if the
underlying land use regulations are subject to meaningful scrutiny.
B. MONOPOLYPOWER, PERSONALIZED EXTORTION, AND "EXIT"
The bargaining problems detailed above are those which arise from the
unique status of government qua government. If we view the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an extension of the structural
constraints placed on governmental entities by the Constitution, these three
bargaining risks comprise the universe of possible unconstitutional
conditions problems. In the land use context, these uniquely governmental
risks relate to the government's ability to promulgate and lift zoning
regulations. If these risks are successfully resolved (that is, the government is
201. Nollafi v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837-38 n.5 (1987).
202. See Been, supra note 2, at 504 & n.149 (noting concern with underregulation as
articulated by scholars and by the Court in Nollan). Been does not view the problem of
underregulation as implicating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and asserts that "none
of the 'solutions' that have been offered for the dangers posed by land use exactions, such as
Nollan's nexus test, makes sense as an effort to control underregulation." Id. at 505-06. The first
point is questionable, given the uncertain status, scope, and purpose of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The second point seems incorrect as a functional matter. It is also
somewhat surprising given Been's discussion of the concern with underregulation expressed in
Nollan, id. at 504 & n.149, and her criticism of Fischel's failure to attend to the risk of
underregulation in his efficiency critique of Nollan, see id. at 544 n.332 (discussing Fischel's
article, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTENIP. PRODS.
101, 104-05 (1987)).
203. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (observing that although "requiring a $100 tax contribution
to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not pass
constitutional muster").
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kept from expropriating land use entitlements from either the landowner or
other segments of the community), the government occupies a position
analogous to that of a private party. Of course, the kinds of bargaining risks
that exist in private party settings may remain problematic. Specifically, the
government's monopoly over a given area may provide it with considerable
bargaining clout, even when the government's rulemaking is limited to the
legitimate sphere.
However, once the built-in distortions associated with the theft of
development rights have been eliminated, opportunities for exit become
meaningful and compelling. Anecdotal evidence suggests that developers
can and do exit when the regulatory climate is too harsh. This does not
mean that exit is always a completely costless or fully satisfactory solution. A
primary objection to the exit solution is that land is unique, so that good
substitutes are often unavailable.2' A related problem is raised when a
particular governmental entity controls not just one isolated area, but
virtually all similar land within a state or region. Yet another concern
relates to the possibility that a local government may be able to engage in a
form of personalized extortion based on an individual landowner's
preferences and access to exit.207 If exit is impossible or extremely costly for
a particular individual and the governmental entity has some insight into
that fact, the bargaining context provides an opportunity to exploit that
weakness on an individualized basis.2 0
204. For example, see Wendy Kummerer, Developers Wal on Office Ptet, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 5,
2000, § 4, at 12 (describing how a developer abandoned a proposed project in Hanover Park
after eighteen months of negotiations with the community; according to Director of Economic
DevelopmentJohn Said, "'[T]hey havejust gone away.'").
205. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WTrH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 186 (observing that after a
developer exercises her right to exit, the new location will be generally "inferior to the first
location, for otherwise the developer would have gone there first').
206. Some land use regulation occurs at the regional, state, or federal level. &e .upra note
1. Where a land use regulation covers a broad geographic area, as the California Coastal
Commission's regulations did in Nolan, the possibilities for 'exit" will be correspondingly
constrained. SeeEPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20,at 186.
207. The term "extortion" is a bit inapt here, since we are assuming that the government is
not able to manipulate the regulatory background illegitimately. However, the phrase
"personalized extortion" nicely captures the notion that the government's market power can
have troubling consequences.
208. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 185; D.L Bennett, Cherchee
in the New Millennium; County Embracing Pay-as-You.Grow Poliy, ATLArAJ. & CoST., Aug. 19,
1999, at 1JQ (discussing discrepancies in exactions imposed on different developers, prior to
adoption of standardized impact fee schedule). This is one reason why land use conditions set
through an "adjudicative" process are more troubling than those set through a legislative
process. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (draing distinction between
legislative determinations that affect large areas of a city, and adjudicative decisions regarding
individual parcels). The legislative/adjudicative distinction has been the subject of some
criticism, see Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City ofAdanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denitd, 515
U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting), though it is possible that
exactions imposed in individual situations are more likely to be invidious. Se Sterk, Nollan,
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Though these risks are not trivial, they are not sufficiently pressing to
justify judicial intervention in the bargaining process. Analogies to private
situations can be helpful in thinking through this issue. Epstein uses the
prototypical "necessity" situation-a desperate ship seeking a dock in a
storm-to illustrate coercive government monopoly power.2 J Yet it is hard
to imagine a landowner whose situation is even remotely analogous to that
of a stranded seafarer facing a single dock in a storm. Instead, the
landowner is much more like a customer who has invested a fair amount of
time and money to shop in a pricey specialty boutique that offers a unique
and much-desired product. There may be no perfect substitutes, and she
may have incurred some sunk costs, but neither death nor financial ruin will
befall her if she chooses not to accept the shopkeeper's exorbitant price.
Judicial intervention to limit the price of a shopkeeper's goods in such a
situation would be ridiculous. After all, there are other shops, even if they
are not quite as nice and do not offer quite the same merchandise.
There is no need for a principle of law that entitles a landowner to buy
her way out of otherwise legitimate land use regulations at a low, affordable
price, just as there is no need for a principle of law that entitles an art
collector to add an original Van Gogh to her collection at a low, affordable
price. It is certainly not constitutionally required. Nevertheless, one should
keep these additional, extra-constitutional bargaining risks in mind when
considering policy alternatives.
2 1 0
C. BARGAINING INANEXTERNALITY-BASED REGULATORYRGIM,
Now that we have surveyed the various types of risks associated with land
use bargains, it is possible to begin developing a mechanism that can address
them more effectively than can the nexus and proportionality solution. As
should be apparent by now, such a solution must place meaningful limits on
the permissible scope of regulation. It also must allow mutually beneficial
bargains while protecting third parties from opportunistic deal-making.2 1 1 In
Henry George, and Exactions, supra note 3, at 1750 (recognizing that unequal treatment is more
difficult to detect in individualized exactions than in traditional zoning). For an excellent
treatment of the problem of piecemeal land use regulation and the difficulties associated with
the legislative/adjudicative distinction, see generally Rose, Planning and Dealing supra note 22,
at 846.
209. See Epstein, Harms and Benefits, supra note 57, at 483 (discussing this example in
context of land use exactions); see also EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 20, at
54-58 (same).
210. For example, it may be desirable, as a normative matter, to institute procedures that
will minimize the chance of monopolistic overreaching in land use bargains. See infra text
accompanying notes 264-273 (discussing procedural adjustments to equalize bargaining
power).
211. Significantly, placing useful limits on the scope of land use regulation will not
necessarily eliminate the need for bargaining. The need for bargaining would only be
eliminated if one could perfectly calibrate land use regulation so that it tracked the social
optimum. See supra text accompanying note 88. To the extent the limits on land use diverge
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the discussion that follows, I show how bargaining limits could be eliminated
212in an externality-based regulatory regime.
1. Constructing a World Without Bargaining Limits
I begin with several simplifying assumptions, which I will later relax.
Assumption #1: Land use regulations are limited to the prohibition of
uses that generate cognizable and unremediated negative externalities.
Assumption #2: It is possible to determine costlessly and with perfect
accuracy whether a given land use actually generates a cognizable and
unremediated negative externality.
Assumption #3: Any land use regulation that exceeds the appropriate
scope (as defined in Assumption #1) can be challenged costlessly and
successfully.
Assumption #4: In making land use decisions, the local governmental
body acts in the best interest of all affected community members (except the
213landowner in question).
These assumptions have at least two interesting implications. First,
strategic expansion of the regulatory background would be impossible
under these conditions. Blatant overregulation of innocuous uses is
foreclosed by Assumption #1. The strategic miscasting of innocuous or
normal features as externalities (for example, asserting that a brick house
generates aesthetic costs because it is not made of marble) is precluded by
Assumption #2. Finally, strategic stretching of the regulatory envelope-
engaging in overregulation that lies close enough to the core of legitimate
regulation as to be unreviewable-is ruled out by Assumption #3. In such a
world, problematic governmental leverage would be eliminated. This would,
in turn, allay the concerns implicit in the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine-the fear that the majority will use its power to manipulate
background conditions to force concessions that are inconsistent with the
Constitution's protections.
A second implication of these assumptions is also powerful: a property
owner can overcome restrictions on land use if she is able to perfectly
remediate the negative externalities associated with that use.' 14 This
from this standard, the potential for advantageous bargains remains.
212. The regime I construct in this subsection is much like that proposed in Fischel, "he
Economics of Land Use Exactions, supra note 15, at 109 (proposing a solution which "limit(s] the
community's initial entitlements to the cost of eliminating nuisance spillovers" and protects
those entitlements wvith a property rule). This is an intermediate step to the solution I will
ultimately propose in Part III, which leaves land use regulation intact but grants landowiners an
in-kind call option.
213. If all of the interests of all community members, inddling Mhe landowner, were perfectly
aggregated in determining land use policies, these policies would track tie social optimum and
no bargaining would be necessary.
214. This resembles a limited application ofa Calabresian system ofgeneral deterrence, in
which "all activities are permitted if they pay for their external costs." Ellickson, Aftemaines to
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becomes clear if one thinks of Assumption #1 as dividing the universe of
possible land uses into two categories: those uses that can be regulated and
those that cannot. The first category includes only those uses producing
cognizable and unremediated negative externalities. Any landowner can
move a specific land use into the second category by fully remediating the215
cognizable negative externalities generated by that use. Thus, a landowner
entering the bargaining arena always holds a fall-back option that effectively
constrains the bargaining range and the leverage of the governmental body.
A requirement that the land use bargain exhibit nexus and proportionality
would be superfluous and inefficient under these circumstances. If the
landowner chooses to escape the regulations by remediating the
externalities, the landowner's fix will necessarily exhibit nexus and
proportionality. The landowner will automatically pursue this route,
effectively purchasing relief from the land use regulation through the
remediation of externalities, unless there is a Pareto-superior alternative.
It is important to recognize how this legal regime would differ from the
current system. First, it would always allow the landowner the option of
remediating the externality and thus escaping restrictions on land use. This
replaces the property rule that currently protects zoning rights with a
liability rule in which the collective entitlement to limit development "must
be exchanged if the landowners pay for specified 'damages' to the
community. "2 16 Under my model, these specified "damages" must be paid in
kind-in other words, the externalities must actually be remediated. 17 It
would also allow the landowner to choose the means of remediation, which
Zoning, supra note 22, at 707 (citing GUIDO CA.ABRESI, COST OFACCIDENTS 95-106 (student ed.
1970)). In my model, only land use regulations (and not generally applicable civil and criminal
laws) can be circumvented, and then only through the actual remediation of externalities
rather than through the payment ofspecified money damages.
215. Because the costs generated by normal or innocuous land uses (however defined) are
not cognizable, the landowner is not faced with the impossible task of remediating all negative
impacts associated with his land use. He need only remediate those negative impacts that are
cognizable-the marginal impacts associated with using the land in an unusually intensive
manner within a given context.
216. Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 324 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
23).
217. I recognize it will often be infeasible or prohibitively expensive to actually remedlate
externalities. See Been, supra note 2, at 544 (observing that "there may be no technologically
feasible way to have both a high-rise and a sunny park"); Dana, supra note 15, at 1282-84
(discussing externalities that are impossible to mitigate). However, in-kind remediation remains
a meaningful concept, if only because it sets the most logically cohesive benchmark from which
to negotiate. If we assume the externalities are real, and properly cognizable, it is appropriate
that the community be able to forbid any uses that generate them. See Fischel, The Economics of
Land Use Exactions, supra note 15, at 110 (describing community's entitlement to elimination of
a negative externality such as congestion). The community can legitimately set the price of
consent to such externalities at any level it finds appropriate-and, as a practical matter, such
payments will usually be far more attractive to the parties than the actual remediation of
externalities would be.
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can be expected to reduce the associated costs. 1 8 As matters currently stand,
the realm of legitimate land use regulation is not narrowly tailored to
encompass only uses that generate negative externalities. The local
government has no obligation under current law to lift a land use restriction
when the landowner offers to remediate the externalities.
The "externality fix" would be only one possible outcome of the
bargaining process. While the possibility that the landowner will retreat to
the fall-back position of remediating externalities places important
constraints on the bargaining process, 9 the parties are free to pursue a
mutually advantageous alternative that lacks the features of nexus and
proportionality. The surplus generated by any such mutually advantageous
exchange will, appropriately, be the subject of bargaining. -"n Such
bargaining does not seem problematic, because the landovMer remains free
to retreat to an externality fix or to exit the jurisdiction if the local
government becomes too greedy.Y'
An example illustrates how a land use bargain might play out in a
stylized setting incorporating the foregoing assumptions. Imagine a small
society whose members live together in very close proximity. One member of
the society, Harriet, wishes to operate a car-crushing business which can be
used to generate a great deal of wealth (the crushed cars are sent a nearby
steel mill for recycling). The problem is the heart-stopping sound of
wrenching metal that accompanies the operation of the car-crushing
machines. A relatively expensive "silencer" is available which would allow the
crushers to operate silently. Assume that the gain to Harriet if she wrere able
to use her crushers without restriction is $1 million, and further assume that
a silencer costs $500,000. The silencer represents an externality fix that
would allow Harriet to use her crushers with impunity. If her only choices
are to purchase the silencer (at a cost of $500,000) or forgo crushing (at a
cost of $1 million), she will purchase the silencer.
However, this may not be the most efficient outcome. It is quite possible
that the community might be swayed by something that Harriet could
provide at lower cost. For example, the community might prefer to restrict
Harriet's hours of operation and accept some other benefit, such as a nature
park, that would be more valuable to the community than the non-stop
218. See Ellickson, Alernalives to 7oning, supra note 22, at 688-89 ("Prevention costs will tend
to be higher when either or both of the parties are compelled to undertake specific steps than
when they are permitted to select voluntarily among available prevenative measures.").
219. To the extent unequal bargaining power remains (as it might where there is no
technologically feasible way to remediate the externalities), procedural adjustments can help to
level the playing field. See supra Part II.B (discussing issues associated uith monopoly po-er);
infra text accompanying notes 249-258 (discussing procedural adjustments).
220. See supra text accompanying note 89 (providing an example of a surplus that will be
subject to bargaining).
221. Because the prospect of theft of development rights has been removed under this
model, a primary problem with exit is eliminated.
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silence achievable through the silencer. If Harriet could provide the nature
park and restrict her hours of operation at a cost of only $300,000, this
would be a Pareto-superior solution. Blocking such a deal makes everyone
worse off than necessary.
Note, however, that Harriet and the community would still have plenty
to bargain over. The additional $200,000 surplus must be split between them
in some fashion. The community might demand additional benefits (a
parking lot or funding for a park ranger, for example) in an effort to
capture some of this surplus. Harriet can counter by threatening to leave the
jurisdiction (although the threat may lack credibility if the car-crushing
equipment is extremely costly to move). She can also threaten simply to buy
silencers. If the community doesn't know precisely how much a silencer
actually costs relative to the cost of the other benefits under negotiation, this
could be a very credible threat. The community knows that if it gets too
greedy, it may end up with tedious silence rather than the exciting new
benefits it was hoping to receive.
By the same token, Harriet may not be able to accurately gauge how
highly the community values various benefits (or how acutely it experiences
certain costs). If she tries to keep the whole $200,000 surplus, the
community may begin to downplay its love for nature and complain ever
more vociferously about the noise of the car crushers. Harriet knows that
insisting on a too-stingy deal could saddle her with having to bankroll the
silencer after all. This type of bargaining does not seem any more troubling
than a bargaining situation between two private parties. In short, it is a
garden variety "hard bargain." 222 It is carried out against a backdrop of
carefully constrained regulation and is further cabined by the availability of
the externality fix. Harriet's use of her land for car crushing has been
properly banned for producing an unremediated negative externality;
Harriet is simply trying to purchase the consent of the community to her
continued use of the land in a manner that produces an unremediated
externality.
Within the confines of our carefully constructed and shamelessly
counterfactual world, opening up the door to any and all land use bargains
seems like a pretty good idea. Not only might it allow a community and a
landowner to reach a more efficient result, it would also permit various local
governments to provide very fine-tuned differential signals regarding their
receptivity to development of various sorts. While some local governments
might be unwilling to permit any intensive land use that failed to fully
remediate all negative externalities, others might be willing to accept a deal
222. See Fischel, Zoning Refon, supra note 74, at 326 (suggesting that the developer is likely
to be the more adroit negotiator and be able to capture most or all of the surplus generated by
a sale of zoning).
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which left some negative externalities unremediated.2 However, these
unremediated externalities would necessarily be outweighed by the package
of benefits offered by the developer or else the deal would not occur. The
price at which this outweighing occurs depends on community preferences
(which are shaped, in part, by the preexisting mix of uses). Thus, the price
of consent to a given land use might vary among jurisdictions, but in no
jurisdiction could it be priced higher than the landowner's cost of
remediating all cognizable negative externalities.
2. A Dose of Reality
The foregoing model appears workable in the context of some rather
artificial assumptions, each of which corresponds to a constellation of real-
world worries. To examine these sticking points, I will consider the
implications of removing each of these assumptions. Moreover, while each
assumption is counterfactual and unrealistic in certain respects, various
policy prescriptions could lead to a legal regime in which that assumption is
more closely approximated. These will be explored at greater length in Part
III.
Relaxing Assumption #1: Land use regulations are limited to the prohibition of
uses that generate cognizable and unremediated negative externalities. In the real
world, land use regulations are not narrowly tailored to address only
unremediated negative externalities. There are at least two possible reasons
for this. The first possibility is that excessive restrictions are imposed for
purely strategic purposes. A second possibility is that the regulation
generates utility for the community in some manner that is not directly
related to the prevention of cognizable negative externalities. -4 Because this
second possibility exists, I do not assert that land use regulations must
address unremediated negative externalities in order to be valid as a
constitutional matter.225
223. To use the terminology suggested by Robert Ellickson, "nuisance costs" would not be
completely eliminated in such situations. See Ellickson, Atmnatimrs to Zening, supra note 22, at
688 (distinguishing "nuisance costs" resulting from externalities from 'prevention costs"
associated with remediating the nuisance costs).
224. Somewhat overindusive line-drawing may also be necessary in the interest of limiting
enforcement and administrative costs. SeeVill. of Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-
89 (1926) (explaining that the "inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective
enforcement" does not make a law invalid where "the bad fades into the good by such
insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being readily distinguished").
225. Constitutionally limiting land use regulations to the remediation of negative
externalities would be inconsistent wvith the general approach of the Supreme Court in the post-
Lochner era. See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost ofLochner: Modern Taiings Dilrine and Its Imparl on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L REV. 605, 640 (1996) ("In post-Lothntr-era cases, the Court
explicitly rejected the notion that the Takings Clause permitted the government to regulate
property for the good of the community only to die extent that the owmer was harming the
community."). McUsic notes, however, that a shift may be underway that would tighten the
reins on property regulation. Id. While I do not attempt to determine the precise location of
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In a completely open-ended regulatory regime, the difficulties would be
those that existed under Simon's reign. 6 Plainly, such an open-ended
regime would be constitutionally problematic under anyone's
interpretation. But could some other sharply defined and perfectly
enforceable limit on land use regulations similarly eliminate the need for
bargaining limits, assuming it were an appropriate limit under the
Constitution? A neat feature of the externality-based system is its automatic
generation of a bargaining cap-the price of full remediation of
externalities. Even in the externality-based world, however, there may
sometimes be no technologically feasible or reasonably affordable
227
externality fix, and hence no true bargaining cap. To the extent the lack
of a realistic bargaining cap seems less troubling in the externality-based
regime, this is likely due to an underlying normative discomfort with land
use regulations which are not tied to externalities (or a belief that the
Constitution forbids such regulations in the first place).
Indeed, an externality-based system has much to recommend it on
normative grounds. Yet one need not accept this particular line between the
permissible and the impermissible in order for my analysis about bargaining
limits to hold. Any strictly enforced limit that prohibited the problematic
"theft" of development rights is equally effective at solving the
unconstitutional conditions problem identified above. 22  However,
monopolistic bargaining power is likely to be more problematic when
something other than an externality-based regime is in place. While it is true
that a feasible externality fix would not always be available under an
externality-based regime, such a fix would never be available under a regime
that used some other criteria for differentiating legitimate from illegitimate
land use regulations. To the extent "exit" is viewed as an imperfect control
on such bargaining power, an externality-based system would be superior.
There are other good normative arguments for an externality-based
system. Its provision of a bargaining cap, even where the cap is not a feasible
alternative, can allay popular fears about government overreaching. The
advantages of an externality-based regime become even clearer when
Assumptions #3 and #4 are relaxed. Externality-based limits will be much
easier to monitor and enforce. In addition, externality-based limits provide
unrepresented elements of the community with a clear focus for challenging
unfair land use bargains.
Relaxing Assumption #2: It is possible to determine costlessly and with perfect
the line between constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible land use
regulations in this Article, I do assume that some constitutional limits exist.
226. See supra Part I.C.2.
227. See supra note 217.
228. See supra Part IIA2. Again, this assumes that the line between permissible and
impermissible regulations, whatever its precise location, corresponds to constitutional
requirements.
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accuracy whether a given land use actually generates a cognizable and unremediated
negative externality. In the real world, it is not alwa)s clear what constitutes an
externality. Moreover, it is not always clear when an externality has been
sufficiently remediated. Because of this, strategic "externality-spotting" may
create bargaining difficulties. For example, perhaps Harriet's community
does not really mind the sound of the car-crushing equipment. In fact, most
members of the community mildly enjoy it. Nevertheless, community
members profess intense hatred of the sound because they hope to obtain
some of the surplus that Harriet will be able to generate. What they really
want is not silence but something else, such as a nature park.
While strategic behavior based on idiosyncratic preferences (such as for
excessive noise) would be all but impossible to eliminate, it is clear that the
notion of externalities presupposes the setting of some meaningful baseline
from which harms can be assessed. Without such a baseline, any private
decision that fails to save the community money or to produce an optimal
level of benefits for others could be characterized as producing
externalities. Externalities might be fruitfully limited to costs generated by
behavior that goes beyond the innocuous or "normal." Normal behavior
might be thought of as producing an "average reciprocity of disadvantage,"
which would be highly inefficient and pointless to monitor.2 1 For example,
walking about and talking in conversational tones on city sidealks
generates some level of noise, inconvenience, distraction, and risk of
collision, but people will, on average, be disadvantaged by this about as
much as they disadvantage other people.u23 To require people to remediate
or pay damages to one another for all such normal activities vould be an
229. See Dana, supra note 15, at 1266 (noting the need to determine which effects of
development "are legitimately labeled externalized social costs or benefits7); Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 71, at 1197 (using example of a ban on billboards to
illustrate this difficulty:. "Shall we construe this regulation as one which prevents the 'harms' of
roadside blight and distraction, or as one securing the 'benefits' of safety and amenit)F). In
our earlier example, Simon was able to frame an externality in the form of higher" medical
costs by measuring from an unfair baseline-a world in which all pedestrians hop.
230. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGs, supra note 2. at 351-55 (arguing that the "normal
behavior" standard should be used to assess land use regulations); Ellickson, Atnathes to
Zoning, supra note 22, at 728-33 (discussing "unneighborliness" as a standard for land use
liability). For example, the hopping rule discussed supra might be invalidated on the grounds
that it prohibited normal behavior-ualking on city sideu"alks.
231. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), the Court indicated that
land use regulations that yielded an "average reciprocity of advantage" for those on whom they
were imposed might be upheld as valid. See Richard Epstein, A Clear Wiw of The Cathedral. The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YAE UJ. 2091, 2103 (1997) (discussing a situation in which
"[t]he benefits to each side from undertaking its preferred activities are the compensation that
each side receives from bearing the small slights caused by others").
232. Smoking, in contrast, is no longer considered normal in most settings. Nonsmokers
are disadvantaged by smoking, but do not impose any reciprocal disadvantages on smokers.
Because nonsmokers constitute a majority, the judgment to relegate smoking to the subnormal
category is relatively straightforward.
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administratively prohibitive and completely pointless wash. Deciding what is
normal or innocuous in the land use context is not easy, however, and
involves making normative judgments as to how land use entitlements
should be split between the community and the landowner.
Particularly troublesome is the situation where the cited externality is
not only illusory, but virtually impossible to remediate as well. Such a
combination eliminates any realistic chance that the land use can be
transformed into a permissible one by the landowner's unilateral action.
This is a serious problem that requires establishing relevant baselines from
which to assess claims of externalities. The question of what baseline is
appropriate is an equity question that involves allocating entitlements
between the landowner and the community. Though the issues are knotty
ones, they should not paralyze efforts to improve land use law. 33 Procedural
adjustments for verifying claims of externalities and the adequacy of
remediating efforts may help to address this problem.
Relaxing Assumption #3: Any land use regulation that exceeds the appropriate
scope (as defined in Assumption #1) can be challenged costlessly and successfully. In
the real world, challenging land use regulations as excessive is likely to be an
expensive and uncertain undertaking. In part, this is a function of the
current, relatively open-ended governmental power to regulate land use. In
a system based on cognizable negative externalities, challenging
overreaching regulations would be easier because there would be a more
meaningful benchmark for assessing when the regulation had gone "too
far."
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to look for mechanisms which would
reduce the administrative costs associated with challenging governmental
action. One such mechanism, discussed in detail in Part III, would be to
protect land use regulations with only a liability rule, such that these
regulations could be violated at the will of the landowner upon the provision
of in-kind remediation of cognizable negative externalities. If this were the
case, restrictions not justified by reference to cognizable negative
externalities could stay on the books, but the landowner would own the right
to engage in the prohibited use upon showing that no cognizable negative
externalities would be thereby generated (or, alternatively, by showing that
any cognizable negative externalities would be remediated). An efficient
administrative system for assessing the impact of new development and
considering whether the associated externalities have been remediated
could therefore offer a reasonably effective (although necessarily imperfect)
substitute for the costless challenge of underlying regulations.
Relaxing Assumption #4: In making land use decisions, the local governmental
body acts in the best interest of all affected community members. Additional
complications arise if we begin to suspect that the community is
233. See FISCHEL, REGULATORYTAKINGS, supra note 2, at 354.
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differentially impacted by the externalities or the benefits, and that the
political process is capable of producing a result that works to the
disadvantage of a minority within the community.2 To return to our
example, we might imagine that a small minority of the community lives
excruciatingly close to the car-crushing plant, such that the noise causes
intense discomfort, while the majority lives far enough away that the noise is
scarcely noticeable. "2M Such a possibility revisits the concern that government
will bargain with land use rights appropriated from parties not represented
at the bargaining table.236 For example, the majority might strike a deal with
Harriet which gives the majority the nature park it desires while leaving a
minority exposed to externalities. Though the minority may get some
benefit from the nature park, the park would not be sufficient to buy its
consent to the unbearable noise. Here, the minority's entitlement to be free
of oppressive noise (or to receive compensation adequate to buy its consent
to the noise) has been illegitimately appropriated by the majority for use in
a bargaining transaction. Even though the land use outcome is efficient
(Harriet can operate her car-crushing plant), the allocative results are
inequitable.
7
Any mechanism for regulating land use bargains must guard against
such possibilities. The requirement of nexus provides one such mechanism,
but it comes at a high price in efficiency terms. A better alternative would be
procedural and statutory protections to ensure that minority interests are
heard before consummation of any land use bargain. Such protections
should be coupled with judicial review to ensure that the bargaining
outcome does not violate substantive due process.
234. It is not clear precisely how a zoning board or other governmental body generates
land use outcomes, although some interesting procedural mechanisms apparently exist. Sre
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 709 n.112 (discussing 'neighborhood voting7
mechanisms contained in section five of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Nct. which
requires a three-quarters majority vote to approve a zoning change opposed by twenty percent
of the landowners in a nearby neighborhood). It is also unclear what motivates zoning boards
or what they attempt to maximize. See SIEC.AN, LND USE WrnHoUT ZONING, supra note 22, at 10
(suggesting that the governing board "may vote from what may be considered the 'highest'
motive, the health, safety, and welfare of the 'people' as conceived by its members, or it may
vote for the basest of reasons, the payment of graft" or for any of tie "many other possibilities in
between"); Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exadlions, supra note 3, at 1738-42 (presenting
hypothetical models of public-spirited, treasury-maximizing, and politicall'.minded municipal
officials).
235. Robert Ellickson's example of a grocery store in the Santa 'Monica mountains, which
would generally benefit the community at the expense of certain near neighbors, raises the
same set of concerns. Ellickson, Alternati'es to Zoning, supra note 22, at 684-85.
236. Seesupra Part I.A.3 (discussing appropriation from third parties).
237. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 690 ([A]n efficient policy maybe
an unfair one, particularly when the gains of the policy are not distributed to those injured by
its imposition.").
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III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR LAND USE BARGAINS
As the foregoing discussion suggests, an externality-based regulatory
regime would foster efficiency-enhancing land use bargains and would
eliminate the need for judicially-imposed limits on land use bargains. Yet it
would be politically infeasible (not to mention highly unsettling) to simply
repeal all zoning law and replace it with externality-based regulations. In this
Part, I propose a possible alternative framework that would achieve the same
advantages without dismantling zoning altogether. In Section A, I outline
the centerpiece of this new framework-an in-kind call option that would
allow landowners to move forward with a proposed use by remediating all
cognizable negative externalities associated with it. Section B sketches how
such a call option might work. In Section C, I discuss a variety of distributive
considerations raised by this new framework.
A. INTRODUCING AN IN-KIND CALL OPTION
At the outset, it is worth stating with some specificity what an in-kind
call option would mean. In most basic terms, a landowner would hold an
option which would allow her to engage in a proposed land use by paying a
specific in-kind price-the remediation of all cognizable negative
externalities.2 8 The landowner thus holds a right to buy something (here,
the community's entitlement to prevent development of a certain nature) at
a specified price (the in-kind remediation of cognizable negative
externalities), while the community has no right to veto the transaction.139
The arrangement is the equivalent of a "call option" in finance, with the
240
'exercise price" set in kind rather than in cash. If a landowner can fix the
externalities associated with the development, she can proceed with the
development. 21
238. The call option would only extend to the kind of land use regulations typified by
zoning; it would not allow a landowner an "option" to violate other, non-negotiable regulations
and laws (such as fire codes, health codes, and ordinary criminal and civil laws). Government
should have reasonably broad discretion under the police power to designate any legitimate law
or regulation as "non-negotiable" and thereby withdraw it from the realm of the landowner's
"call option." This is true even when the law impacts in some way on land use-as, for example,
fire codes do.
239. A party holding an interest protected by a property rule retains the power to veto any
and all deals at her option, while a party whose interest is protected only by a liability rule lacks
such veto power. Morris, supra note 23, at 853-54. Under current law, the community's interest
in compliance with valid zoning regulations constitutes a property interest, in that it need not
approve any noncompliant proposals.
240. SeeAyres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1041 & n.49 (explaining that under a liability nile,
a defendant holds a "call option" and can elect "to buy the entitlement for tie damage
amount"); Morris, supra note 23, at 852 (discussing "call" as a form of liability nile).
241. The call option is uniquely associated with a particular piece of land and runs with the
land until it is exercised or sold to the local governing body. This feature distinguishes the call
option from a system of transferable development rights ("TDRs"), in which the right to
develop can be severed from a particular piece of property and transferred to a different piece
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Granting landowners such an option can be thought of as transforming
the community's property entitlement in a particular regulatory regime
(which allows it to forbid any and all uses that are incompatible with the
zoning regulations) into an entitlement protected by a species of liability
rule.242 Though I will refer to the in-kind call option as a liability rule, it
.. . . . . 243
should be noted that this categorization is not inevitable. Insofar as the
call option grants landowners the unilateral power to move forward with
projects which do not comply with the zoning regulations upon payment of
a specified "price," it indeed acts like a liability rule. Yet it might also be
recast as an adjustment in the community's property rights.244
Under such a regulatory regime, the community would not hold a
property right in a particular zoning regime (such that all noncompliant
proposals can be vetoed), but would instead hold a diminished set of
entitlements that would allow it to veto any project that generates cognizable
unremediated negative externalities. Significantly, the "damages" which the
landowner must pay are tied not to the harm suffered as a result of the
development (as would be the case with an ordinary liability rule) but
instead are tailored to safeguard the community's entitlement to be free of
cognizable unremediated externalities. Zoning is nominally left in place, but
its character and coercive power is transformed. Where compliance with a
particular land use regulation is inefficient, the landowner will hold an
option to bypass it by remediating the relevant externalities (or
demonstrating that no such externalities exist).
How might such a mechanism fit into the legal landscape? Given that
the Constitution has not been interpreted to require an externality-based
regulatory regime,2 and given the constraints of federalism,2 46 I believe that
of property. See Frank Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights, in WINDFMIS FOR WIPEOUTs.
supra note 109, at 532, 536. TDR-Iike outcomes might nevertheless be achieved under the call
option system. See infra note 270.
242. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1105-06 (distinguishing liability rules, in
which "an external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the transfer of the
entitlement" from property rules, in which the transfer occurs only at the entitlement holder's
option "and at the price at which he subjectively values the property"); see aLso Ellickson,
Altenaives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 738-48 (discussing a system ofliability rules in which land
uses could be pursued upon payment of damages).
243. A formidable body of scholarly work has developed around the property rule/liability
rule distinction pioneered by Calabresi and Melamed. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 23;
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Econorui Ana{sis, 109
HARV. L RE V. 713 (1996);James E. Krier & StewartJ. Sclwab, Property Rules and Dablaty Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L REv. 440 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, BReso/ing
Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Eeonomirs of Injunetit'e and Damage lterrdes, 32 STAN. L RE%. 1075
(1980); Symposium, Pr"perty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalenabiliy: Twunt-,Fe Year Retl rolaite,
106YALELJ. 2083 (1997).
244. See Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, supra note 23, at 2178-79 (explaining that a
liability rule merely divides entitlements in a particular -ay).
245. See supra note 225 and accompaning text.
246. While some uses of land are regulated at the federal level, property law remains
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the preferable path would be for states to modify their zoning enabling acts
247to incorporate the framework described here. However, federal courts
would still have a role in enforcing the outer limits on land use regulation
mandated by the takings clause, and a stricter standard than the one
currently in use might well be appropriate for that task . 4
B. How THE CALL OPTION WouLD WoRK
While full practical details of the call option mechanism are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is possible to sketch out the basic workings.
Subsection 1 discusses the procedure for establishing the in-kind exercise
price-the "externality fix." Significantly, the landowner's exercise of the in-
kind call option is only one possible outcome of a bargaining session. In
Subsection 2, I discuss the possibility that the community may wish to
purchase the call option from the landowner so as to block development
even with the externality fix. Subsection 3 explains how the call option
operates as a "bargaining cap," allowing the parties to choose more efficient
alternatives that will generate a larger surplus for them. A fourth possible
outcome is not treated separately, though it hovers in the background
throughout any bargaining session-the possibility that the landowner will
simply choose to walk away.
1. Setting the Exercise Price
My framework contemplates an initial colloquy between the landowner
and the governmental body, in which the landowner presents the proposed
land use, and the government responds by identifying the negative
externalities that would be associated with that use. This closely resembles
the first step of any negotiation for a zoning variance. To return to the car-
crushing case, Harriet would present the zoning board with her proposed
car-crushing facility, and the zoning board would respond by identifying
various externalities. Here we will assume the only externality in question is
"excessive noise." Harriet could then formulate and propose an externality
fix. Importantly, she would only need to demonstrate the ability to
remediate the marginal increment of negative externality associated with the
intensified development or use. In other words, she would only need to
demonstrate that her "silencer" buffered the sound of the car-crushing
equipment to a level consistent with the uses permitted under the existing
zoning code; she need not eliminate all detectable noise. Allowing Harriet
primarily the province of state government (which states may choose to delegate to localities).
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and defined
by state law.").
247. SeeJacobsen & McHenry, supra note 109, at 346-47 (discussing state zoning enabling
acts).
248. Of course, the bargaining limits articulated in Nolkin and Dolan would need to be
overruled as an initial matter, in order to clear the way for this proposed alternative.
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to choose her own way to remediate the identified externalities is more
efficient than forcing her to use a particular remediation strategy. This
initial step-verifying the relevant externalities and assessing what would be
sufficient to remediate them-might require some procedural refinements
to ensure that game-playing does not confound efforts to arrive at a fair
249
exercise price.
Another procedural change would place certain burdens of proof on
the landowner. Once the landowner has proposed a nonconforming use
and has been informed by the governing body of the sorts of externalities
associated with that use, the landowner should bear the burden of
demonstrating precisely how she plans to remediate those externalities. The
landowner should likewise bear the burden of providing detailed
information about any other alternative plans. Because the landowner has
no right to use her property in a manner that produces cognizable and
unremediated externalities, and because she stands to benefit through a
zoning change that will permit her to engage in the nonconforming use, it is
appropriate that she should bear the burden of demonstrating exactly how
she will go about the remediation in question. The community should not
bear the cost of helping the landowner figure out how to avoid harming the
community.
This procedural shift is consistent with the greater landowner autonomy
and choice provided under my model. The situation is no longer one in
which the government forces a landowner to give something up, but rather
is one where a landowner voluntarily offers a self-selected proposal.
To return to our example, let us assume that the expensive silencer is
the only viable solution. Harriet presents the zoning board with the plans for
the car-crushing facility with silencer attached. This would set the stage for a
bargaining session between the governmental body and the landowner. That
bargaining session would have four possible outcomes: (1) the landowner
proceeds with the externality fix;2 (2) the governmental body buys the
249. An important feature of most liability rules is the fact that the damage amount is
determined by an independent entity and does not necessarily track the subjective valuation of
the party who is protected by the liability rule. Se Morris, supm note 23. at 854 n.82 ("The
.objective' price set by the collective (usually, by a court) may or may not equal the holder's
subjective valuation of the in-kind component."); see also Ayres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1065-
72 (discussing the advantages of "untailored" damages assessments). Given the fact that
remediation of cognizable externalities is amenable to (more or less) objective determination,
it is unclear whether it would be necessary to add a "neutral" administrative body to determine
the adequacy of a proposed externality fix or whether the threat ofjudidal review would be
sufficient to make the government act in good faith in approving or disapproving a particular
externality fix. External standards might also be appropriate in certain situations, such as those
that currently govern the cleanup and redevelopment of "brownfield" sites. SeeJ. Linn Allen.
Toxic Land Healthy for Daeloper, CHI. TRts., Jan. 30, 2000, at Cl, av'aiW.e at 2000 WVL 3631755
(reporting that the EPA issues a "no further remediation" letter after a review of a developer's
documentation indicates the cleanup meets the applicable standards).
250. Exercising the call option would transfer relevant pieces of the community's interests
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landowner's call option to prevent the development from occurring; (3) the
landowner and the community agree on an alternative that the landowner
can provide at lower cost than the externality fix;251 or (4) the landowner
walks away.
2. Buying Up the Option: Paying Premiums to Avoid Development
When confronted with a proposed project, a governmental body might
offer to buy the landowner's call option. This would allow the community to
realize associational preferences and other intangible values unrelated to
any cognizable negative externalities.2 2 If the community found the
prospect of having a car-crushing plant in the area truly upsetting, even if
the silencer eliminated all noise from the plant (and all other cognizable
negative externalities were remediated as well), it could approach Harriet
with an offer to pay her not to build the plant. Harriet would agree if the
amount offered her exceeded the net amount she could expect to yield
from her plant after implementing the externality fix. If Harriet accepted
the deal, she would receive the agreed-upon compensation and the call
option would be removed from the land. In other words, the community's
interest in nondevelopment, formerly protected only by a liability rule,
would henceforth be protected by a property rule. Further development
would not be prohibited, but the community would hold full veto power and
would consequently have a much-enhanced bargaining position.
Allowing governmental bodies to purchase call options introduces some
potentially troubling strategic possibilities. Imagine a flurry of proposals for
jails, mental institutions, and homeless shelters in the best neighborhoods,
not because those neighborhoods made attractive sites, but because the
most money could be extorted from their affluent and squeamish residents
for not building.25 3 By purchasing the call option, the community transforms
its interest in nondevelopment into a property rule, and prevents the same
in nondevelopment to the landowner at the specified in-kind price. The landowner's share of
property interests in the land would be expanded (a leftward move in Figure 1). I assume that
the transferred portion of the interest would be protected by a property rule, such that the call
option, once exercised, could not then be repurchased by the governmental body to end the
land use in question. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1041 n.50 (discussing the same
assumption, while noting that a contrary rule permitting repurchase would be possible, and
citing Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 738-48, for an example in which a
factory's option to "pollute and pay" might be revoked).
251. Choices 2 and 3 correspond to the two "Coasean Bargains" identified by Ayres and
Talley under a liability rule. SeeAyres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1038, 1042 tbl.1. The utility or
disutility that each party associates with the land use will be signalled by the alternatives each
seeks to pursue; in this way, the call option serves an "information-forcing" function. Id. at 1100.
252. The community would, of course, be subject to applicable constitutional and statutory
restrictions in seeking to realize associational preferences.
253. SeeAyres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1044 (noting that parties who place a low value on
the exercise of a call option "might feign a high valuation so that plaintiffs would bribe them
not to exercise their option").
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or subsequent landowners from threatening an endless series of undesirable
projects on the same stretch of land and receiving a continuous stream of
compensation from the oversensitive community. Nevertheless, the risk that
savvy developers might be able to engage in such bluffing even once seems
unsettling.
There are several responses to this risk. First, the cost associated with
documenting the feasibility of a site-specific externality fix (a cost borne by
the developer under my model) should deter casual efforts at extortion.
Second, all cognizable negative externalities would have to be ameliorated
under any exercise of a call option, so the threatened project would only be
objectionable on vague "not in my backyard" grounds. While perhaps
people should have some power to exclude certain things that they find
distasteful from their communities, it is appropriate that the exercise of this
preference should come at a price. Third, assuming there is a "public use"
involved (a low threshold under current law),Z the community could
choose to acquire the land through its power of eminent domain. The
community's ability to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay just
compensation for the land itself places an upper limit on the price that a
landowner can exact for a call option.
5
A community could also head off such concerns by simply acquiring
undeveloped land and maintaining it as a buffer zone. Alternatively, a
close-knit community that wished to prevent future development or to
otherwise preserve the character of the community could agree to sell all of
their call options at once, or could form a binding agreement to refrain
from exercising them for some period. This would achieve much the same
result as a private covenant among the landowners. 7 Certain categories of
home buyers might seek out communities that have sold their call options or
have signed a binding agreement not to exercise them for some period. The
254. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (stating that the court *%ill
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use
'unless the use be palpably uithout reasonable foundation'") (quoting United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
255. The amount of compensation should reflect the value of the land with the call option
intact-that is, the amount the land would be worth to a landowner r.,ho has the power to
engage in any given land use by remediating the cognizable negative externalities associated
with that use.
256. This is a tactic that is frequently used by conservation groups to stop un,anted
development. See, for example, Barbara Sherlock, Consen'ation Trst Mfay Step in to Buy Batatwa
Land Slated for Development; CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, at C5, arailatle at 2000 WIL 3631402
(reporting that the Trust for Public Land was considering the purchase of a fourteen-acre
marsh area slated for retail development).
257. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Corenants, and Cornunmttes, 61 U. Ct. L Rwv. 1375,
1395 (1994) [hereinafter Gillette, Courts, Cotenants, and Communities] (observing that for *those
who desire more control than can be afforded by zoning or market mechanisms alone,
covenants provide both a private means of rulemaking that reflects those desires and a
stabilizing precommitment device against changing preferences").
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popularity of housing developments featuring incredibly rigid land use
restrictions indicates the value that might be associated with this feature. 8
While further development would not be absolutely prohibited, the
community would be in a much stronger bargaining position and would
hold full veto power.2
59
Another strategic risk is that the governmental body will try to buy up
all call options in the community before anyone has any interest in more
intensive development. Such a mass buy-up would, in effect, grant the
community veto power over any land use that does not conform with
existing land use restrictions.260 However, one would not expect landowners
to sell their call options lightly; the call option significantly enhances the
current and potential value of land, and has serious implications for its
resale value. Land use deals would not be prohibited after the transfer of a
call option, but the landowner's bargaining position would be seriously
weakened. Other things being equal, developers could be expected to seek
261out parcels of land with call options intact and pay a premium for them.
3. Settling for Less: When an "Externality Fix" is Inefficient
As my examples suggest, there are many imaginable instances in which
the remediation of all cognizable negative externalities will not be the
efficient solution. An alternative will clearly be more efficient than the
externality fix if it is both cheaper to the landowner and more valuable to
the community. 262 If there are several alternatives that meet this criteria, the
258. See id. at 1384-85 (discussing residential association covenants governing such matters
as "kinds of pets that can be kept within the association, numbers of guests that can be
accommodated, the erection of a satellite dish, the size of a mailbox, exterior colors, and the
types of vehicles maintained on the premises") (citations omitted); see also JOHN DEIAFONS,
LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (2d ed. 1969) ('If the controls exercised by
public authorities over land-use in America seem excessively detailed and capricious, the
controls happily adopted by private citizens are positively sadistic.").
259. This assumes that a community group that sold its call options would continue to have
controlling power with the local governmental body. Where such control is uncertain, a
binding agreement to refrain from exercising call options for some time period might be a
preferable approach.
260. This assumes that the underlying zoning regulations are constitutionally permissible
and that the community is not exercising its veto power in a manner that otherwise violates the
Constitution (or state or federal law). The content of a call option, and implications of
retaining or selling it, will depend upon the operative constitutional limits on land use
regulation.
261. I am assuming here that the call option, once sold, could not be repurchased by the
landowner. However, this makes little practical difference. Even without the call option, a
landowner can still try to convince the community not to exercise its veto power with respect to
a proposed development by offering a very attractive deal. The amount of extra compensation
required to overcome the community's veto power should be precisely equivalent to the
amount she would have to pay to "repurchase" the call option if this were allowed.
262. A bargain that would leave one of the parties better off while leaving the other no
worse off would also be Pareto-efficient, although the no-better-off party might refise to
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parties could be expected to pursue the one generating the largest total
surplus. Plainly, the landowner will not pursue an alternative which is more
costly to her than the externality fix.?
One concern with this solution is that it will provide a back-door
method for manipulative extortion of the sort decried in Nolan. The fear
that governmental bodies will engage in strategic externality-spotting
remains significant, particularly where the governmental body is able to
assess and exploit the bargaining position of an individual developer. There
is a concern that the governmental body will complain about something it
cares nothing about in order to extract something it really wants from a
party that truly has no choice. Some relatively minor procedural adjustments
can reduce this risk. One such adjustment would require that the landowner
initiate any alternative proposal, and that the community vote on it as a take-
it-or-leave-it proposition.26 If the deal is approved, the right to engage in the
proposed project is purchased at the developer-proposed price. " ' If the deal
is rejected, the landowner must choose whether or not to exercise the call
option or to simply walk away from the proposed project." As Ian Ayres and
Eric Talley have pointed out, giving one participant "the power to make an
all-or-nothing offer allocates a great amount of market power" to that
party.267
Overreaching might be redressed in certain limited circumstances by
removing the more powerful party's "initiation power," but there is still a
danger that the more powerful party could pressure the other party into
initiating a given deal.2 s This danger translates in the land use context to a
governmental body's heavy-handed hints (or outright statements) about
"what it would take" to get a particular deal approved. However, it would be
possible to formulate a rule forbidding any direct statements to individual
developers about the price of consent, other than the list of externalities
which must be remediated. ' 69 Under such a rule, individual project approval
would never be expressly or implicitly conditioned on any particular
concession. This offers a formal level of protection against "takings"; in a
consent to the deal unless some of the surplus accruing to the other party were shared with her.
263. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 23, at 1043 (stating that "defendants will never consent
to pay more than $50 for what they can take nonconsensually for $50").
264. See iUL at 1049-50 (discussing a "take-it-or-leave-it bargaining interaction).
265. See idL (describing bargaining move in which a defendant offers to purchase an
entitlement from the plaintiffat a price chosen by the defendant).
266. See id at 1050 (discussing the alternatives remaining to a defendant holding a call
option if her take-it-or-leave-it offer is rejected).
267. Id. at 1049 n.74.
268. Morris, supra note 23, at 859-60 n.98.
269. Though this would present obvious enforcement challenges, it should be no more
difficult to implement and enforce than prohibitions on bribery and graft. The fact that the
landowner would be in a position to inform on an overreaching governmental official should
make such communications relatively rare.
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meaningful sense, the landowner's concession becomes a "giving." A
landowner can offer any package deal she sees fit, including pieces of her
own land, but such concessions are never forced, encouraged, or even
invited by the government.
Prohibiting governmental bodies from initiating land use bargains
could also be expected to improve the quality and quantity of public
information available to landowners and developers. Unable to initiate
personalized bargains based on the unique situations of individual
landowners, governments would have an incentive to publicize information
about the kinds of concessions it would view with favor, the kinds of
development it hopes to attract, and the sorts of special concerns it has
about growth.2 7 0 This would allow local governments to signal different
degrees of receptiveness to development, and should be expected to foster a
more efficient distribution of new development. It would eliminate
inequitable treatment of different developers based upon the developer's
financial situation and opportunities for exit.
27 1
To the extent the landowner has the opportunity to set the agenda by
presenting her proposal first, the community would be expected to accept
the offer if it generates net benefits for them. Indeed, individual members of
the community who perceive that the package is in their best interest would
likely pressure the governmental body to accept the offer as made. 7 2 This
grassroots pressure might never surface in the situation where the
governmental body presents the terms of an offer to the landowner.2 3 Even
270. For example, certain communities might be particularly receptive to solutions that
would minimize overall development within a given area. The ability to enter into binding
contracts not to exercise one's call option, see Gillette, Courts, Covenents, and Communities, supra
note 257 and accompanying text, introduces the possibility of TDR-like alternatives to the
externality fix. For example, a landowner proposing a development that would increase density
on a particular block might be able to purchase the consent of the community more affordably
by showing that all of the surrounding landowners on that block have contractually bound
themselves not to exercise their call options. A community could publicly signal its receptivity to
such arrangements and perhaps even facilitate such private side-arrangements (by, for example,
maintaining a register of interested parties), as long as the choice whether to propose such a
solution remained with the developer. Similarly, impact fees might be publicized as an
acceptable alternative to fixing certain sorts of externalities, though the option to propose an
alternative or to engage in an externality fix would remain with the developer.
271. Cf Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 22, at 907-08 (suggesting that a system which
encourages communities to think ahead and publicize their intentions" can increase
predictability and reduce unfairness).
272. Cf Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 709 ("Although it may appear
corrupt on the surface, an excellent way to handle conflicts is to encourage the landowner to
distribute monetary payments to his neighbors to enlist their support for his project.").
273. If the governmental entity were fully aware of the preferences of the community and
acted as a perfect proxy for those preferences, the community's reactions to proposals would
not be expected to change outcomes. However, it seems probable that community preferences
are not likely to be fully formulated, much less fully voiced, until after a focal point of some
kind has been placed on the bargaining table.
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if the landowner could counterpropose in that situation (as landowners can
under current practice), the community's response to the counterproposal
would be consciously or unconsciously conditioned by the earlier
consideration of a more favorable alternative. Where the landowner
presents the first proposal, the status quo and the externality fix provide the
only relevant comparison points. Moreover, the community must accept or
reject the proposal in an up-down vote. The risk of rejecting a landowner's
proposal for purely strategic reasons is great. The landowner may exercise
the call option and proceed with the project accompanied by an externality
fix, or he may exit thejurisdiction altogether.
There is an additional concern with lower-cost alternatives to the
externality fix. As discussed above, it is quite possible that the controlling
interests in a community might reach an agreement with a landowner that is
fully satisfactory to both of the bargaining parties but which imposes
unremediated negative externalities on third parties-whether a minority
within the community, or individuals outside the political subdivision. As a
practical matter, such results are likely to be relatively rare because zoning
boards tend to be quite responsive to the concerns of the surrounding
community in making land use decisions. "-' Appropriate notice and hearing
procedures could flush out objections to a particular bargain before it is
consummated and could forestall most problems. "  Likewise, state enabling
legislation could explicitly build in the requirement that land use bargains
take into account the interests of all affected parties. 26
Judicial review should be available as a backstop, however. Where a
particular bargain constitutes inappropriate and unfair governmental
action, it should be amenable to challenge as a substantive due process
violation.2 r By adjusting the amount of harm that must be demonstrated in
order to raise such a challenge, the ability of third parties to block socially
beneficial land use bargains would be minimized while still ensuring that
minority interests are not disregarded in the bargaining process. In certain
types of cases, other constitutional protections might apply. For example, if a
274. See Ellickson, Allenatives to Zoning supra note 22, at 709 ('A landowner seeking a
variance, conditional use permit, or zoning amendment is more likely to be successful if the
affected neighbors are not opposed.").
275. See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 22, at 894-96 (discussing the importance and
limitations of notice and hearing in the context of piecemeal land use changes).
276. This would make local government action in violation of this principle subject to
challenge as a matter ofstate law. See generally Powell, supra note 200 (discussing challenges to
municipalities' statutory authority to impose exactions).
277. See Electro-Tech, Inc. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 445 N.W.2d 61, 78-81 (Mich. 1989)
(Brickley, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and discussing the application of substantive due
process to land use cases);J. Peter B)ne, Ten Arguments for te Atolition of tte Jrlndato "Tabng%
Doctrine, 22 EcoLOGYLQ. 89, 131 (1995) (noting the potential role of the Due Process Clause
in preserving fairness in land use regulations).
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land use bargain had a disproportionate impact on a protected class, the
Equal Protection Clause would come into play.
C. DISTRIBUTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
My framework would begin by granting all landowners a call option
which would allow them to purchase any desired portion of the community's
bundle of entitlements in the landowner's land in exchange for the
remediation of cognizable negative externalities. This would downgrade the
community's holding from a property right to an interest protected only by
a liability rule, and it would effect a distributive shift from the community to
the landowners. The magnitude of the shift would depend on the degree to
which the property entitlements formerly held by the community contained
restrictions on development that were not associated with preventing
cognizable negative externalities.
Simply adding a new mechanism, such as an in-kind call option, does
not automatically resolve the troubling baseline issues that I have been
discussing throughout the Article. Questions as to what should count as an
"externality" and what should be deemed sufficient to "fix" that externality
are not easy ones. Nuisance law provides one resource, 278 though "nuisance"
is not without analogous definitional problems. 2 9 Moreover, it is not clear
that nuisance is a concept inclusive enough to capture all of the relevant
externalities. For example, a continuing concern for communities is that
development "pay its own way. "2ss This expresses the intuition that
externalities may take the form of marginal degradation of public services,
excessive strains placed on public facilities, and other incremental harms
and costs that are not unique to the new development but which must
somehow be absorbed by the community as a result of the new development.
Enjoying a premium public facility without paying one's fair share does not
fit comfortably within traditional notions of nuisance. Also troublesome are
matters of aesthetics, which are not always addressed by nuisance law.
28
'
278. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 177, at 112-21 (discussing antinuisance rationale for
the police power); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 154 (1995) ("[Clommon law nuisance can govern the
constitutional acceptability of land use regulation.").
279. See FISCHEL, REGULATORYTAKINGS, supra note 2, at 61 ("The 'nuisance exception' (to
the takings clause] may be a sensible rule, but it begs the question of who is to decide what
constitutes a nuisance."). But see EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 177, at 120 ("The nuisance
language may be often misunderstood and misused, but the conception has no inherent
weakness that makes misuse inescapable.").
280. See, for example, ALTSCHULER & GoMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 4, at 77-96.
281. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning supra note 22, at 733 (citing Mathewson v. Primeau,
395 P.2d 183 (Wash. 1964), in which a neighbor's hogs were deemed an actionable nuisance
due to their wafting odor, but piles of junk heaped on the neighbor's premises were not
deemed actionable). Aesthetics may be the greatest source of concern in the land use context.
See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 22, at 910 (noting possibility that "the most serious
spillovers or externalities of land use fall within the vague field of aesthetics: the way the area
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Some restrictions, such as those typically associated with residential
zoning, are generally thought of as preventing entrants from free-riding on
an attractive neighborhood environment without providing reciprocal
benefits for their neighbors.28 While part of the objection can be rephrased
in terms of negative externalities imposed on existing homes (aesthetic
blight, traffic congestion, increased burdens on public facilities), this does
not always fully capture the harms associated with free-riding. Many zoning
ordinances mandate a minimum lot size or even a minimum square footage,
blocking entry not only of the "parasitical" apartment building that might
impose observable negative impacts on the neighborhood,'8 but also of the
slightly more modest single-family home.2 Even if the smaller house is
completely screened from view, and even if it imposes no special burdens on
the community as a whole, there is still a free-rider problem. Because local
government services are primarily financed through property taxes, it vould
be possible to free-ride on these services by buying a very inexpensive house
(with accordingly low property taxes) in a community filled with much more
expensive houses.2s5 Minimum lot sizes and density regulations vere
developed to rule out certain housing options, such as smaller properties or
multi-family dwellings. 286 This has the effect of keeping lower-income
residents out of the "better" neighborhoods.
The ability of local governments to offer different mixes and levels of
public services and facilities to their "customers" may well be compromised if
newcomers cannot be prevented from free-riding in the manner just
described.287 Of course, this line of reasoning assumes that individuals
looks, sounds, feels, and smells").
282. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 10-15 (discussing zoning as a device to protect the
property values of the well-off).
283. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (V]ery often the
apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces
and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the disuict.').
284. For example, see Cheryl Meyer, Small-House Request Fails First Zoning Bid, CIii. TRIB.,
Feb. 12, 2000, § 4, at 12 (reporting that the Lakewood zoning board unanimously rejected
proposal to ease the requirement that homes contain a minimum of 2800 square feet. with at
least 1800 square feet on the first level of a two-story home). Interestingly, one Chicago suburb
is seeking to impose maximum square footage requirements to prevent developers from
replacing demolished homes with new ones that will "unpleasantly dwarf their neighbors."
Karen Mellen, Glencoe Studies Zoning Changes to Scale Bad: Teardouns, CH TRI., Apr. 27, 2000, §
2, at 3.
285. See FISCHEL, REGULATORy TAsr Os, supra note 2. at 260-61 (discussing how zoning
responds to the risk that people would build inexpensive houses in upscale communities in
order to obtain high-quality services without paying high taxes).
286. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 23 ("[A]dvantaged communities face a steady and high
demand for entry from residents of less desirable communities" who could gain access in the
absence of zoning "[b]y occupying high-density housing and thereby economizing on land
costs.").
287. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Loral Gatmrrnts 12
URB. STUD. 205, 205 (1975) (contending that in the absence of zoning ordinances requiring
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choose between different "baskets" of governmental services and facilities in
the same way that one chooses breakfast from a menu-based on individual
taste. Wealth differences make this model highly questionable. Good schools
and safe neighborhoods are not idiosyncratic preferences peculiar to the
well-off, and nobody really has "a taste" for crime-riddled neighborhoods
and substandard schools.
288
When neighborhoods are exclusive, they may also serve the expressive
and status preferences of residents. The name of a neighborhood can
immediately convey a sense of prosperity. The owner of an inexpensive
house in such a neighborhood can be viewed as free-riding on the
neighborhood's exclusive reputation and, in the process, eroding it. The
smaller house's property value is also increased by its location in a "good"
neighborhood, while the small house does not reciprocally add to the value
of the neighboring properties. Put another way, the small home takes the
place of what would otherwise be a larger, property value-enhancing home
and arguably dilutes the value of the neighborhood. It is possible that this
results in an actual decrease in property values, though this may or may not
289be the case in any given instance. Whether or not property values drop
demonstrably, there is arguably an issue of associational preferences at stake.
However, it seems doubtful that the government has any interest in
subsidizing the satisfaction of such preferences.
It should also be noted that the concept of free-riding is a bit slippery in
this context, since it is an expected and not aberrational feature of living in
a civil society that benefits and burdens will not be allocated with
mathematical precision. One of the functions of government is to provide
certain kinds of public goods to everyone in society, including the poor. One
might therefore accuse a wealthy community of free-riding when it fails to
provide its fair share of these goods to the less well-off. ° Minimum lot sizes
residents to consume some minimum amount of housing and to pay the associated property
taxes, "the Tiebout Hypothesis seems to be a formula for musical suburbs, with the poor
following the rich in a never-ending quest for a tax base").
288. Gerald E. Frug, City Senoces, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23,31 (1998).
289. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 767 ('Although homeowners may
believe that construction of a nearby apartment building will depress property values, there is
little evidence to support such fears.") (citing FHA valuation standards reported in Bernard H-1.
Siegan, Non-7oning in Houston, 13J.L. & ECON. 71,103,106 (1970)).
290. This was the rationale in the controversial Mount Laurel decisions. See S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 483-91 (NJ. 1983) (Mount Laurel
I) (formulating remedies to ensure communities provide a "fair share" of low and moderate
income housing); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,
731-32 (NJ. 1975) (Mount Laurel 1) (stating that a municipality "must, by its land use
regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there, of course including those of
low and moderate income"); see also Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 642-
43 (N.J. 1986) (discussing the extent of the constitutional obligation to provide a fair share of
lower income housing). For a discussion of the Mount Laurel cases and their impact, see
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and similar exclusionary devices may offer real advantages to some
communities, but this does not mean that zoning law should be configured
to allow the costless realization of those advantages.
A related difficulty involves the line between a use that generates no
externality at all and one that generates an "unfixable" externality. For
example, a proposed development that violates a height restriction may
generate no negative externalities other than "excessive height." This can be
viewed on the one hand as no cognizable externality at all, and on the other
hand as an "unfixable" externality. Likewise, some structures are
objectionable solely because they do not look like other, preferred
structures (such as single-family homes).2' In such cases, the purported
"externality" is the disutility associated with enduring the existence of a
disfavored design in one's vicinity, not for any identifiable trouble it causes,
but simply because it exists. A similar question is whether purely financial
impacts, such as a drop in property values (or a failure to contribute
reciprocally to the maintenance of high property values), should count as an
externality. The assertion that a particular development will "alter the
character" of an area is generally rooted in such financial concerns, as wrell
as in concerns over aesthetics.
Drawing the line on externalities is an allocational choice that will
determine the content and value of the call option held by the landowner,
as well as the amount of power over development retained by the
community. 2 Because my approach allows adjustments in either direction
through future transactions, under Coasean assumptions, the initial
allocational choice will not impair efficient land use.293 Nevertheless, the
desire to achieve distributive equity and to minimize transaction costs urges
some care in drawing this line. In my view, height and density limits seem to
be a valid proxy for other kinds of cognizable externalities, such as reduced
light and space, and increased congestion.
In contrast, purely financial externalities that are neither linked to
identifiable spillovers such as noise, congestion, or traffic, nor to identifiable
impacts on public services, should be deemed presumptively noncognizable.
To recognize and require remediation for financial impacts associated with
the development of an area unnecessarily entangles the state in the
Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount Laure Czses 70
NEB. L. R jv. 186 (1991).
291. See, for example, Tim Pared, Palatine Res Town Home Plans, CHI. Twoe., Jan. 30,
2000, § 16, at 71, reporting that council members who rejected a town home proposal expressed
concern that the roof lines did not sufficiently resemble single-family homes.
292. Cf. Fischel, The Eronomics of Land Use Exarlions, supm note 15, at 110-11 (stating that in
order to fairly allocate initial land use entitlements, a determination must be made as to the
types ofdevelopment a communityshould be permiued to regulate).
293. &e Ronald Coase, The Problem ofSodal Cos4 3J. L & EcoN. 1, 15 (1960) (obsering that
where "market transactions are costess.., a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it
would lead to an increase in the value of production").
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operation of private markets. Unaesthetic uses (at least those falling within
some "normal" range of ugliness) and uses found objectionable solely on
"status" grounds (i.e., for failing to be a single-family home) would seem to
fall in the same category.M Homeowners in pricey residential districts would
not be left without an option, however. They could create a binding
agreement to not exercise their own call options and could buy up a buffer
of surrounding land to prevent encroaching development. Alternatively, the
community could purchase the developer's call option (or the land itself)
and preclude development.
To the extent the component unrelated to negative externalities
(however defined) was very large or very valuable to the community,
granting the call option could raise some equity concerns. Current property
owners may have paid a premium to purchase land in a community with
restrictive zoning, making this change in the legal rules arguably unfair.?9
Yet each landowner would be receiving something quite valuable in
compensation for this change: a call option to develop on her own property.
Even if an individual landowner has no interest in exercising the call option
herself, the option would run with the land and theoretically heighten its
resale value. Moreover, given the frequency with which zoning designations
change and variances are granted, a purchaser could not realistically expect
to be fully insulated from all development for all time-and even less so to
be fully insulated from development that generates no cognizable negative
externalities. Though it is an empirical question worthy of further inquiry, it
seems unlikely that granting landowners a call option of the sort discussed in
this Article would seriously interfere with reasonable, investment-backed
expectations or generate severe inequities.
In the long run, equity would appear to be enhanced by granting in-
kind call options. These call options would open up more site choices to
developers and the would-be residents and businesses they represent. By
permitting land uses upon the remediation of externalities, the call option
would weaken the ability to exclude merely for the sake of exclusion.9 6 It
could, therefore, be expected to make inroads into exclusionary zoning
practices of all types. 9 7 Because it would allow any land use for which the
government could not identify negative externalities, socioeconomic
294. Frederick Acker's performance zoning proposal draws similar lines between "harms"
(such as fumes, noise, and traffic) and "nonharms" (such as "[u]nattractive design" and "small
lot size"). Acker, supra note 25, at 394.
295. Cf Fischel, Zoning Reform, supra note 74, at 311-12 (noting potential equity concerns
that would be associated with the abolition of zoning).
296. It would not, however, be eliminated, assuming that the governmental body would be
permitted to purchase the call option from the landowner. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
government's ability to buy the landowner's call option).
297. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning supra note 22, at 703-05 (discussing exclusionary
and discriminatory effects of zoning).
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discrimination and other unfair exclusionary practices would no longer be
able to hide behind a broad, impenetrable "planning" rationale. Forcing
governmental bodies to articulate valid, legally cognizable reasons for
blocking a particular land use provides a check on regulations that are
actually based on impermissible factors.
Another equity consideration involves the relative treatment of earlier
and later developers. While the in-kind call option would place an upper
bound on the bargaining range, it would not completely eliminate this form
of disparate treatment. This could occur either because new externalities are
identified over time (such as the impacts on fragile ecosystems) or because a
community becomes increasingly sensitive to externalities.M At the early
stages in a community's growth cycle, it may actively court developers and
businesses, perhaps by granting special tax exemptions or unilaterally lifting
land use restrictions. As a particular community gains a thriving economic
base, it will understandably become less interested in further development
and more sensitive to negative externalities. At some point, our hypothetical
community will begin to demand either that externalities be remediated, or
at least that some amenities be provided to help keep community life
pleasant and livable. Later still, the community may become so antigrovh
that it will attempt to purchase call options held by developers (or,
alternatively, acquire buffer land zones using its power of eminent domain).
Some have argued that it is presumptively unfair to place conditions on
land uses which were permitted without any such conditions at an earlier
point in time. Ellickson has asserted that "growth controls unfairly
prohibit owners of undeveloped property from duplicating the
developments of earlier landowners" and improperly "increase the price of
entry for people moving into an area."s~o Yet it makes sense that there
should be differential pricing for development over time and in different
areas as communities reach critical mass.s5u While Ellickson questions
whether planners can ever determine the optimum size of a community,
allowing fluctuation in prices for the transfer of the collectively-held property
rights embodied in zoning should act as an aid to the "private migration
298. An additional possibility is that a new understanding of propert could evolve over
time as a result of moral insights. SeeT. Nicolaus Tideman, Tahings, Moral Eroulian, andJustuie,
88 COLUM. L Rtv. 1714, 1720 (1988) (analogizing new moral insights to technological insights;
once chlorofluorocarbons were found to be harmful, "[w]e could not design a change that
made no one worse off than he or she expected to be because what we expected, tie continued
costless emission of CFC's, turned out to be impossible.").
299. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WTrH THE STATE, supra note 20, at 188-89 (contending that a
test of consistency should be applied to exactions); Ellickson, Suburban Growth ContwrL supra
note 125, at 448-49 (pointing out that early arrivals contribute just as much to congestion as do
late arrivals).
300. Ellickson, Altenatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 768.
301. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theoy of LoarlaExndiur 64J. POL EcON. 416,419-20
(1956) (discussing ways in which communities might seek to achieve optimum size).
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302decisions" he applauds. Ellickson also argues that growth controls are
unnecessary because "[i]f a particular area becomes too dense, its residents
will perceive the disadvantages of this high density and tend to leave."30 3 Yet
it is much more efficient for a community to send signals that will optimally
encourage or discourage entry, rather than waiting for residents to react to
overcrowded conditions by moving out.
Moreover, landowners would hold call options that they cannot be
forced to sell, which means that no use is completely excluded from any
community, except to the extent that a governmental entity chooses to
exercise its power of eminent domain. Asking a landowner to bear her own
share of the externalities associated with her development is equitable. The
price at which consent will be granted to a given land use in the absence of
an externality fix may, however, fluctuate. Conversely, some landowners may
even be able to extract payments from local governments for agreeing not to
exercise their call option.W4 These fluctuations in price and resistance points
are analogous to those one might encounter in private markets and present
no cause for concern.30 5 It is both predictable and desirable that the
preferences of a community towards development of various types would
change over time. Far from being inequitable, such varying preferences
allow local governments to signal their amenability to development and to
help channel development in the most efficient directions.
CONCLUSION
Judicial limits on land use bargains stem from a well-meaning protective
impulse and a healthy skepticism of government, but they ultimately fail to
deliver on the promise of effectively curtailing overregulation or bettering
the lot of landowners generally. The theoretical shortcomings and logical
inconsistencies of the Nollan/Dolan approach become apparent when the
strategic concerns expressed in those opinions are considered systematically.
Efficient land use requires more flexibility and more coherence than these
302. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 22, at 769 (contending that public
regulation is less likely than private decisionmaking to achieve optimal distribution).
303. Id.
304. Landowners retain veto power and cannot be forced to sell their call options. This
assures them of the ability to develop if the externality fix is implemented.
305. The absurdity of arguing that the price of a given commodity should remain constant
over time and across localities is apparent. Members of a society with a market economy
understand that they may at times have to pay a higher price than their neighbors for an
identical good, merely because of the vagaries of timing, supply, demand, and other market
conditions. Here, the commodity in question-consent to development that generates negative
externalities-fluctuates in response to various conditions and pressures. Although the
government is involved in aggregating and registering community preferences, the shift is
closely analogous to an ordinary market shift that would not trigger any special landowner
protections. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTYAND THE CONSTITUTION 145-50 (1977)
(observing that the takings clause is understood to restrain only reductions in property value
that involve a significant degree of state involvement).
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judicial bargaining limits can offer. A new mechanism is needed which can
get to the heart of the strategic dilemma in a coherent manner.
A thorough understanding of the bargaining problems associated with
land use transactions is critical to the development of such an alternative.
Unconstitutional conditions implicating the takings clause arise when a
governmental entity purports to bargain away a land use entitlement it has
stolen, either from the landowner or from third parties. Preventing such
theft by placing appropriate limits on land use regulation offers a more
logical solution than curtailing what local governments may do with the
proceeds. One way to draw the line on land use regulation is to require that
regulations go no further than necessary to redress cognizable externalities.
Indeed, the judicial limits on land use bargains have already created
pressure in this direction, though the long history of zoning and land use
planning presents a formidable obstacle.
The in-kind call option outlined in this Article would provide a shift to
an externality-based regime without requiring a complete dismantling of
current zoning law. The definitional issues associated with the notion of
"cognizable externalities" are thorny indeed, but no more so than the kinds
of inquiries the judiciary has already opened itself up to (such as whether
regulation goes "too far"). While the call option alone would not resolve all
land use bargaining problems, it would represent a substantial improvement
over the current law, particularly when coupled with the procedural
adjustments suggested here. Judicial review of land use bargains may still be
necessary in some instances to protect the interests of those who are
unrepresented in the bargaining transaction. However, scrapping the
requirements of nexus and proportionality will put a great deal of control
over land use back in the hands of landowners and communities.
This Article grapples with an issue that lies at the intersection of two of
the most difficult and intractable problems known to law-the question of
how society should allocate control over the use of property, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Both problems (separately and in
combination) have been so exhaustively analyzed that adding another article
to the heap seems almost presumptuous. Yet the most intractable aspects of
the matter remain unsolved, and the need for fresh perspectives and new
ideas has become increasingly pressing in the years since Nollan and Dolan.
This Article does not purport to offer a fully articulated practical solution.
Nevertheless, I hope it will achieve the more modest goal of advancing the
dialogue on this important topic.
